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ARTICLES
INFORMATION GAPS AND SHADOW BANKING
Kathryn Judge
This Article argues that information gaps—pockets of information that
are pertinent and knowable but not currently known—are a byproduct of
shadow banking and a meaningful source of systemic risk. It lays the
foundation for this claim by juxtaposing the regulatory regime governing
the shadow banking system with the incentives of the market partici‐
pants who populate that system. Like banks, shadow banks rely heavily
on short‐term debt claims designed to obviate the need for the holder to
engage in any meaningful information gathering or analysis. The securi‐
ties laws that prevail in the capital markets, however, both presume and
depend on providers of capital to perform these functions. In synthesizing
insights from diverse bodies of literature and situating those understand‐
ings against the regulatory architecture, this Article provides one of the
first comprehensive accounts of how the information‐related incentives of
equity and money claimants explain many core features of securities and
banking regulation.
The Article’s main theoretical contribution is to provide a new explana‐
tion for the inherent fragility of institutions that rely on money claims.
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The existing literature typically focuses on either coordination problems
among depositors or information asymmetries between depositors and
bank managers to explain bank runs. This Article provides a third expla‐
nation for why reliance on short‐term debt leads to fragility, one which
complements the established paradigms. First, information gaps increase
the probability of panic by increasing the range of signals that can cast
doubt on whether short‐term debt that market participants had been
treating like “money” remain sufficiently information insensitive to merit
such treatment. Second, information gaps impede the market and regula‐
tory responses that can dampen the effects of a shock once panic takes
hold. Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis is consistent with the
Article’s claims regarding the ways shadow banking creates information
gaps and how those gaps contribute to fragility.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 103
I. FOUNDATION ........................................................................................................... 110
A. Equity v. Money ........................................................................................ 110
1. Equity claims ...................................................................................... 111
2. Money Claims ..................................................................................... 113
B. Two Sustainable Systems: Securities v. Banking
Regulation ................................................................................................ 118
1. Securities Regulation ...................................................................... 118
2. Bank Regulation ................................................................................ 121
II. SHADOW BANKING ................................................................................................ 126
A. The Rise........................................................................................................ 126
B. Information in the Shadow Banking System ............................... 130
1. Money Claims ..................................................................................... 130
2. Beyond Money Claims .................................................................... 132
C. Information Gaps ..................................................................................... 135
III. THE NEW INFORMATIONAL CHALLENGE ......................................................... 137
A. Information Gaps in Context............................................................... 138
B. Incomplete Information and Market Functioning .................... 142
C. Information Gaps and Systemic Stability ...................................... 145
1. Tendency to Run ............................................................................... 146
2. Shock Absorbers ............................................................................... 149
IV. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION GAPS IN THE CRISIS ........................................... 153
A. Escalation .................................................................................................... 153
B. Restoring Stability ................................................................................... 157
C. Qualitative Support and the Importance of Terminology ..... 160

INFORMATION GAPS 3.15.17 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/22/2017 10:15 AM

Information Gaps and Shadow Banking

103

V. LOOKING AHEAD .................................................................................................... 162
A. A New Regulatory Paradigm............................................................... 163
B. Implications for Reform........................................................................ 166
1. Post‐Crisis Reforms ......................................................................... 167
2. Structural Changes........................................................................... 169
3. State Dependent Information Generation ............................. 171
C. Beyond Shadow Banking ...................................................................... 172
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 174

T

INTRODUCTION

RADITIONALLY, the United States has had had two parallel re‐
gimes for moving capital from persons who have it to persons
who need it—the capital markets and the banking system. Both re‐
gimes served the socially useful function of providing financing for
productive undertakings, but each raised capital through the issu‐
ance of different types of financial claims. The paradigmatic claim
issued in the capital markets is an equity claim, while most of the
capital in the banking system comes from the issuance of “money”
claims.1 Equity claims, such as common stock issued by a public cor‐
poration, are perpetual. The value of an equity claim can fluctuate
significantly and typically is realized only through trading in a sec‐
ondary market. In contrast, money claims, which include familiar in‐
struments like the demand deposits issued by banks and more in‐
novative instruments like commercial paper backed by highly rated
collateral, are very short‐term instruments. The value of a money
claim is fixed and most money claims are structured to allow the
holder to walk away at any time without penalty.
These differences between money claims and equity claims con‐
tribute to two very different informational environments. Equity
markets, like the New York Stock Exchange, typically “level up” the
informational playing field through publicly observable prices that
contain meaningful information about the value of underlying as‐
sets. This works because the same processes that reward sophisti‐
cated investors for engaging in costly information gathering also

1 See infra Section I.A. While one could consider all financial claims as existing along a
spectrum with longer‐term debt residing between these two extremes, there are rea‐
sons to treat these two ends of the spectrum as qualitatively distinct. Id.
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move prices to more efficient levels. Money markets, by contrast,
“level down” the informational playing field through claim struc‐
tures that make it costly and unrewarding for claimants to acquire
superior information about the underlying assets. A person acquir‐
ing a money claim relies, instead, on a proxy indicating that the
claim is exceptionally low risk coupled with a right to exit quickly
and at face value as a substitute for perfect information. This makes
money markets highly liquid most of the time, but it also contributes
to their inherent instability. Securities and bank regulation address
the unique informational dynamics in the domains they governed.2
As reflected in the stability of the financial system between the
Great Depression and the 2007–2009 financial crisis (“the Crisis”),
this overall scheme worked exceptionally well for a long period of
time.
The Crisis wreaked havoc on the financial system and revealed a
third systemically important regime—the shadow banking system.
The shadow banking system is an intermediation regime that re‐
sides in the capital markets while serving many of the economic
functions traditionally fulfilled by banks.3 With the benefit of hind‐
sight, it is evident that this system had been growing for decades
prior to the Crisis.4 Nonetheless, it was not until the Crisis revealed
Id.
How best to define the shadow banking system is a matter of ongoing debate. This
Article makes no effort to resolve this issue, as the dynamics at issue here are widely
recognized as core to shadow banking, however defined. E.g., Morgan Ricks, The Money
Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation ix (2016) [hereinafter Ricks, The Money
Problem] (recognizing that the term “‘shadow banking’ . . . has come to mean different
things to different people,” while taking the position, based on the author’s experience
at the Treasury Department during the Crisis, that the term is best understood to refer
to “the financial sector’s use of vast amounts of short‐term debt”); Zoltan Pozsar et al.,
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. No. 458, Shadow Banking, at Abstract (2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645337 [https://perma.cc/A5TP‐XABX] (explaining how
“the shadow banking system provide[s] sources of inexpensive funding for credit by
converting opaque, risky, long‐term assets into money‐like and seemingly riskless
short‐term liabilities”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural Ad‐
dress for the Inaugural Symposium of the Review of Banking & Financial Law, 31 Rev.
Banking & Fin. L. 619, 623, 625–26 (2012) (noting that “we lack a concrete definition of
shadow banking” while also emphasizing that “a high level of institutional demand for
(especially) short‐term debt instruments” was a critical factor in the growth of what is
now “known as the ‘shadow banking system’”) (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Global
Securities Regulation After the Financial Crisis, 13 J. Int’l Econ. L. 799, 803 (2010) (em‐
phasis added and citations omitted)).
4 See infra Part II.
2
3
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this regime to be inherently fragile and capable of bringing down
the rest of the financial system, that policymakers, market partici‐
pants and other experts started to appreciate its distinctiveness and
importance.5 Recent estimates suggest that the shadow banking sys‐
tem in the United States is larger than the banking system and
poised for further growth.6 Among the factors contributing to this
growth is that companies and institutional investors currently hold
massive amounts of cash that they want to store for future use,7 but
banks are not suited to accept deposits in such large amounts.8 How
best to regulate this system is one of the most pressing issues in fi‐
nancial regulation today.9
5 E.g., Morgan Ricks, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation 4 (Colum. L. and
Econ.,
Working
Paper
No.
370,
2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571290
[https://perma.cc/7TG5‐ZWH3] (explaining that “at the height of the crisis, very nearly
the entire emergency policy response was designed to prevent shadow bank defaults
through a series of ‘temporary’ and ‘extraordinary’ interventions.”); Tobias Adrian &
Hyun Song Shin, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. No. 439, The Changing Nature of
Financial Intermediation and the Financial Crisis of 2007‐09 4 (2010) (observing “that
those institutions involved in [shadow banking] were precisely those that were at the
sharp end of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007”). See also infra Part IV.
6 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Risk Taking, Liquid‐
ity, and Shadow Banking—Curbing Excess while Promoting Growth 66 (2014) (stating
that “only in the United States do shadow banking assets exceed those of the conven‐
tional banking system”). See also infra Section II.A (summarizing recent data on the size
and growth of shadow banking).
7 E.g., Adam Davidson, Why Are Corporations Hoarding Trillions?, N.Y. Times Mag.,
Jan.
24,
2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/magazine/why‐are‐
corporations‐hoarding‐trillions.html [https://perma.cc/Z9UK‐5PJ3] (noting that
“American businesses currently have $1.9 trillion in cash, just sitting around. . . [a] state
of affairs unparalleled in economic history”).
8 See infra Section II.A.
9 E.g., Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual
Funds as Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 131,
174 (2011) [hereinafter Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk] (arguing that proposed
changes to money market mutual funds threaten to “destabilize an industry that has
been remarkably stable” and would “plac[e] broader capital markets in substantial and
unnecessary danger”); Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role of Debt in the Finan‐
cial System 3(Bank for Int’l Settlements Monetary and Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No.
479, 2015), http://www.bis.org/publ/work479.pdf [https://perma.cc/H59A‐PFJW]
(arguing that “the logic behind transparency in stock markets does not apply to money
markets” and this “matters because a wrong diagnosis of a problem is a bad starting
point for remedies”); Perry Mehrling et al., Bagehot was a Shadow Banker: Shadow
Banking, Central Banking, and the Future of Global Finance 1–2 (Nov. 6, 2013) (un‐
published manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232016 [https://perma.cc/4BA2‐
BTMX] (arguing against “the widespread impulse to frame the question of appropriate
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This Article makes two contributions to the effort to devise a re‐
gime for regulating shadow banking. First, it demonstrates why nei‐
ther of the existing paradigms for financial regulation can address
the distinct challenges posed by shadow banking. Second, it shows
how the information gaps that this Article identifies as endemic to
the shadow banking system contribute to its fragility. In the process
of exploring these issues, the Article reveals an important shortcom‐
ing in current understandings of how the distribution of information
affects market functioning. And it provides a novel explanation for
the inherent fragility of institutional structures that rely heavily on
money claims.
The Article begins by explaining how securities and bank regula‐
tion have evolved to address the informational needs of the equity
and money claimants, respectively. Equity claimants are strongly in‐
centivized to gather and analyze information.10 Securities regulation
harnesses and facilitates these inclinations through a regime that re‐
lies on market participants to assess the value of assets underlying
equity claims. The primary role of regulation is to facilitate these
market‐based processes.11 Money claimants, by contrast, tend to be
skittish and minimally informed.12 The banking system addresses
these dynamics through the creation of a powerful body of regula‐
tors authorized to limit bank activities, supervise bank operations,
provide liquidity to a healthy bank facing excessive withdrawals,
and close a bank down if its financial health becomes too precari‐
ous.13 In each case, someone has high‐quality information about the
undertakings being funded by the capital coming into the system,
the nature of the associated risks, and the ability to take actions re‐
sponsive to those risks.
The same is not true with respect to shadow banking. The shadow
banking system is an interconnected web of institutions that oper‐
ates largely in the capital markets. This means that the default regu‐
latory regime governing the shadow banking system is the disclo‐
oversight and regulation of shadow banking as a matter of how best to extend the exist‐
ing system of oversight and regulation as it is applied to traditional banking,” and sug‐
gesting that shadow banking should instead be viewed as “the centrally important
channel of credit for our times, which needs to be understood on its own terms”).
10 See infra Subsection I.A.1.
11 See infra Subsection I.B.1.
12 See infra Subsection I.A.1.
13 See infra Subsection I.B.2.
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sure‐oriented regime designed to govern equity claims and other
investments.14 But money claimants do not have the same incentives
as equity holders or other long‐term investors; they will walk away
before engaging in meaningful information collection and analysis.15
This has little to do with the claimants, who are often the same so‐
phisticated parties that undertake the information‐generating activ‐
ities that promote efficiency in the equity markets. Rather, it is in‐
herent in the nature of money. A financial claim ceases to function as
money if the holder perceives there to be any meaningful credit risk,
or even if the holder is uncertain about the amount of credit risk a
claim poses.16 In contrast to the banking system, however, there is
no body of informed and powerful regulators who can step in to as‐
sure money claimants or minimize the effects of their departure
when doubts arise. As a result, it is often the case that no one has
high‐quality information about the assets underlying the shadow
banking system, how risks are allocated across that system, and
other pertinent information.
In undertaking this structural analysis, this Article reveals a
shortcoming in the conceptual toolkit used to analyze how infor‐
mation and ignorance affect market functioning. One frame com‐
monly used to examine these dynamics focuses on how information
is distributed among parties. When one person has information, a
second lacks it, and frictions limit the first person’s ability to convey
that information to the second, an “information asymmetry” results.
As Professor George Akerlof famously demonstrated using the used
car market, in a world where asset quality varies and sellers know
more than buyers, information asymmetries can prevent otherwise
efficient transfers.17 A second common paradigm builds on the dif‐
ference between “risks” and “uncertainty.” As Professor Frank
Knight explained, risks arise when “the distribution of the outcome
in a group of instances” is known. Uncertainty, by contrast, is “not

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Subsection I.A.2.
16 Id.
17 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 495–96 (1970). Others have shown that modest infor‐
mation asymmetries can actually facilitate market functioning, as the ability to capital‐
ize on informational advantages can play a critical role by incentivizing market partici‐
pants to engage in costly information collection and analysis. See infra Section III.B.
14
15
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susceptible to measurement.”18 The risk‐uncertainty dichotomy is
useful because there are tools that can be used to manage risks that
are not available when one is confronting an “unknown unknown.”
The shadow banking system creates an informational challenge
not captured in either of these frames. Because much of the capital
flowing into the system comes from minimally‐informed money
claimants but there is no robust regulatory oversight, shadow bank‐
ing results in large pockets of information that is pertinent and the‐
oretically knowable but not actually known by any market partici‐
pant or regulator. This Article identifies such “information gaps” as a
distinct type of information dynamic and an important mechanism
through which reliance on money claims contributes to fragility.
This is the Article’s theoretical contribution.
Because the shadow banking system is built on money claims, a
high degree of ignorance among persons holding money claims is
the norm. Information gaps thus do little to detract from, and may
even facilitate, market functioning so long as confidence reigns.19 In
the face of a signal that raises doubt about whether money claims
are backed by sufficient collateral to obviate the need for due dili‐
gence, however, the situation changes dramatically. Upon such a
change in state, information gaps increase the probability of wide‐
spread panic. This fragility arises because money claimants will run
not only when increased credit risk so justifies, but also when in‐
formation gaps prevent money claimants from being able to assess,
with the minimal effort they can rationally invest, whether the
claims they hold are among those exposed to the newly revealed
18 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 232–33 (Cosimo Classics 2006)
(1957). True Knightian uncertainty is usually presumed to be unknowable. E.g., Milton
Friedman, Price Theory 282 (1976 ed.) (“In his seminal work, Frank Knight drew a
sharp distinction between risk, as referring to events subject to a known or knowable
probability distribution and uncertainty, as referring to events for which it was not
possible to specify numerical probabilities.”) (emphasis omitted); Daniel A. Farber, Un‐
certainty, 99 Geo. L.J. 901, 901 (2011) (“Economists distinguish between ‘uncertainty’
(where the likelihood of the peril is nonquantifiable) and ‘risk’ (where the likelihood is
quantifiable).”); Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity and Contractual Conditions,
34 Del. J. Corp. L. 755, 759 (2009) (explaining that “‘[r]isk’ refers to randomness whose
probabilistic nature is extremely familiar and can be characterized with objective
probabilities” whereas uncertainty “refers to randomness whose probabilistic behavior
is extremely unfamiliar, unknown, or even unknowable”). This may elide aspects of
Knight’s original analysis.
19 See infra Section III.B.
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risk.20 A lack of information can thus lead to runs, even on solvent
institutions. This mechanism is different than the more established
coordination and information asymmetry challenges, and one that
likely operates in conjunction with such dynamics to increase the
probability and size of panics.21
Accentuating the systemic risk emanating from information gaps
is the way those gaps impede the market and regulatory processes
that can blunt the adverse effects of a run and help the market
achieve a new equilibrium.22 Ignorance on the part of market partic‐
ipants limits the entry of loss‐bearing capital, which is often critical
to deterring further runs. At the same time, the government cannot
provide market participants the information they require, provide
appropriately priced guarantees, or deploy the other stability‐
inducing devices because it too lacks high‐quality information.23
Focusing on information gaps sheds new light on the systemic
risk arising from shadow banking and the reforms required to ad‐
dress it. Most importantly, because complexity increases the pool of
potentially pertinent information and the costs of acquiring that in‐
formation, the analysis provides fresh support for structural re‐
forms that seek to simplify financial instruments and institutions.
Additionally, by revealing that information production will inevita‐
bly be, and ought to be, incomplete, this Article demonstrates the
value of having mechanisms that can ramp up information produc‐
tion in response to early signals of systemic distress.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I addresses the differ‐
ences between equity claims and money claims and the regulatory
architecture that traditionally supported the capital markets and
banks. Part II introduces the shadow banking system—what it is
and why the current regulatory regime is ill suited to support it. Part
III explores current understandings of the ways that the distribution
of information affects market functioning and the importance of de‐
lineating information gaps. Part III also provides a conceptual ac‐
count of how information gaps contribute to systemic risk and ad‐
versely affect the processes required to establish a new equilibrium
once panic sets in—the Article’s main theoretical contribution. Part
See infra Subsection III.C.1.
Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
20
21
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IV shows that evidence from the Crisis is consistent with this Arti‐
cle’s claims regarding the presence of information gaps in the shad‐
ow banking system and the tendency of such gaps to increase fragili‐
ty. Part V addresses implications.
I. FOUNDATION
This Part lays out, in simplified terms, the differences between
money and equity claims and the regulatory regimes that arose to
support the issuance and trading of each. In so doing, it synthesizes
insights from disparate bodies of scholarship. One byproduct of the
historical separation of banking and capital markets is that policy‐
makers, academics, and other experts tend to specialize in just one
of these two domains. An additional challenge is that in contrast to
the relatively robust dialogue between legal academics and financial
economists on matters of corporate governance and securities regu‐
lation, a similar exchange is only in its infancy in discussions of
banking and shadow banking. In distilling key insights from experts
in various fields and showing how those insights help to explain the
current regulatory architecture, this Part provides the first compre‐
hensive account of how the information‐related incentives of money
and equity claimants explain key differences in banking and securi‐
ties regulation.
A. Equity v. Money
A wide variety of financial instruments can be issued to raise cap‐
ital, and money claims and equity claims, in some regards, are mere‐
ly two ends of a long spectrum. In focusing just on these two types of
claims, this Article largely ignores longer‐term debt and the wide
range of other financial instruments that lie between these two ex‐
tremes, resulting in a stylized account of the markets and regulatory
regimes it describes. The nuance lost in this approach is important
and additional examination of the markets that lie between these
extremes could further illuminate the issues here raised. Nonethe‐
less, even this coarse analysis suffices to establish the core challeng‐
es here at issue.
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1. Equity claims
Equity claims are investments. Persons acquire equity in hopes
that the value of the claim they hold will go up and are quite aware
of its potential to go down. The expected return on the investment is
the reason animating the deployment of capital. Contributing to the
information sensitivity of equity claims is that they are perpetual,
meaning that the holder can receive cash in exchange for a claim on‐
ly by finding a third party willing to acquire the claim. These charac‐
teristics, and holders’ desire for liquidity, have prompted the crea‐
tion of secondary markets, many of which are robust and public.
These characteristics contribute to equity markets being infor‐
mation‐rich environments. A primary way that investors seek to
maximize the probability that their investments will be profitable,
and ideally more profitable than other similarly risky investments,
is by gathering and analyzing information relevant to the value of
claims they might acquire. This does not mean that all investors
have or believe they have superior information about the value of
claims being traded; there are many noise investors who do not, and
the presence of such investors is actually critical for enabling more
sophisticated investors to profit despite the resources they expend
gathering and analyzing information.24 Nonetheless, informed trad‐
ing drives equity prices most of the time.
As Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman explain in
their work on the mechanisms of market efficiency, in public equity
markets, the degree of informational efficiency “depend[s] on the
costs of information and the costs of arbitrage—that is, the costs of
trading on information.”25 In a later work, they explained that “[t]he
24 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
Va. L. Rev. 549, 578 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, MOME] (“It is only because
uninformed traders cannot infer all information from price—i.e., because prices are
“noisy”—that informed traders enjoy a return on their information up to the point at
which further trading moves prices beyond the noise threshold.”) (emphasis omitted).
See also Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price
Systems, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 246, 248 (1976) (“[I]t is only because prices do not accu‐
rately represent the true worth of the securities (i.e., the information of the informed is
not fully conveyed through the price system, to the uninformed) that the informed are
able to earn a return to compensate them for the costs associated with the acquisition
of the information.”).
25 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Cri‐
sis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313, 330 (2014) [hereinafter
Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs]. Their work has significant explanatory power
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lower the cost of information, the wider its distribution, the more
effective the operative efficiency mechanism and, finally, the more
efficient the market.”26 And, because the defining feature of an in‐
formationally efficient market is that the price at which a claim is
trading conveys meaningful information about its relative worth,
even a trader that has undertaken no due diligence has high‐quality
information about the value of claims he is buying or selling.27
Critical to the analysis here is that Gilson and Kraakman presume
numerous, dispersed traders, often with the aid of reputational and
other intermediaries, engaging in ongoing “efforts to acquire addi‐
tional information, efforts to refine forecasts and deepen the predic‐
tive value of information already in hand, and efforts to determine
the accuracy of information already in hand.”28 Traders undertake
these costly efforts because they are rewarded for doing so. Critical‐
ly, the processes through which they are rewarded include the same
mechanisms that enhance price accuracy. These processes are con‐
tinuous and iterative. Market prices are constantly—and contigu‐
ously—moving up and down as traders obtain new information, re‐
vise their analyses, and buy or sell in light of that information. As
described by Professor Bengt Holmstrom, “[e]very piece of infor‐
mation about the value of a firm is relevant for pricing its shares”;
“[t]his is reflected in the billions of dollars that investment banks
and other[s] . . . spend on learning about firms,” and results in “[a]
continuous flow of information . . . into the stock market.”29
These characteristics of equity claims also underlie the social
functions played by equity markets—facilitating the efficient alloca‐
tion of capital among competing projects and promoting firm gov‐
ernance.30 The capacity to produce price signals that compound het‐

across all markets, and actually can help explain many of the features seen in money
markets as well. Nonetheless, their framework initially focused on “the relatively well‐
functioning and continuous markets for public equities.” Id. at 330.
26 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715, 717 (2003).
27 See infra Section III.A (examining these dynamics).
28 Gilson & Kraakman, MOME, supra note 24, at 565.
29 Holmstrom, supra note 9, at 7.
30 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950‐2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1469
(2007) [hereinafter Independent Directors] (arguing that independent boards of direc‐
tors maximize shareholder value); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solu‐
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erogeneous views on a firm’s prospects is core to the utility of equi‐
ty markets.
2. Money Claims
As banking experts have long known and some influential finan‐
cial economists are starting to highlight, the economics and function
of money claims are dramatically different than equity claims. Inves‐
tors acquire money claims when they place a premium on being able
to convert that claim into cash quickly and at par. They deploy their
capital because they prioritize liquidity and safety over the expected
rate of return on that capital.31
Money‐like claims have two related characteristics that enable
them to serve this function—they are very low‐risk and very short‐
term. Low risk does not mean no risk,32 but a person will only treat a
claim like money, rather than an investment, when he expects to be
able to exit at par.33 This is related to the short‐term nature of the
claims, as the ability to exit at par at any sign of trouble—or even an
increase in uncertainty—helps to explain why holders treat money
claims as virtually risk‐free when markets are functioning well.34 It
also means that if a money claimant chooses to exit, it is the issuer

tion to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047, 1048 (1995) (arguing that mandatory
disclosure of information related to securities leads to efficient allocation of capital).
31 See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton et al., The Flight from Maturity 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20027, 2014) (explaining that “[m]oney market instru‐
ments [that] are not insured . . . resemble demand deposits” in that they function as a
“fairly safe store of value and easy access to the cash because of their short maturi‐
ties”); Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk, supra note 9, at 135 (“People who keep their
money in MMFs, like those who keep their money in federally insured depository insti‐
tutions such as commercial banks and credit unions, can expect to obtain cash from
their funds virtually on demand, and can expect that the value of their investments will
not decline in nominal terms.”).
32 See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See
Them Coming 19 (2012) [hereinafter Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises] (not‐
ing that “only the government is able to provide completely riskless collateral”).
33 Id. at 28 (explaining that “in order for [a financial claim] to be used as money . . . it
must not trade at a fluctuating discount and it must not be vulnerable to the fear of a
sudden discount from par”).
34 The omnipresent exit right can also play an important role disciplining issuers of
money claims. See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demanda‐
ble Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 497, 497
(1991) (showing how the distinct discipline imposed by short‐term debt can help deter
malfeasance by bank managers).
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rather than the claimant that bears the burden of finding a third par‐
ty willing to acquire a comparable claim.
Like equity claims, money claims serve a number of socially use‐
ful functions, including facilitating transactions and serving as a re‐
liable store of value over time.35 The important role of such claims is
reflected in new evidence suggesting that money claims and other
exceptionally low‐variance—“safe”—assets have consistently con‐
stituted at least one‐third of all financial assets in the U.S. financial
system since 1952, despite dramatic changes in the size and compo‐
sition of the financial system over the same period.36
One of the greatest differences between money and equity mar‐
kets relates to the depth and distribution of information among
market participants. In particular, while equity markets tend to be
information rich, money markets tend to be information sparse.
This is in part a byproduct of the structure of money claims. Because
money claims are exceptionally short‐term, low‐variance instru‐
ments designed to be redeemable at par, holders have little incen‐
tive to generate private information and any effort to do so is quick‐
ly cost prohibitive.
The different information dynamics that underlie money and eq‐
uity markets reflect the fact that these markets often overcome the
classic challenge that information asymmetries can inhibit market
functioning in quite different ways.37 Equity markets primarily rely
on mechanisms that reduce asymmetries by ensuring all market
participants are relatively well informed. Money markets, by con‐
trast, often overcome the challenge of adverse selection through
structures predicated on mutual ignorance or by obviating the rele‐
vance of private information.38 Liquidity in both markets thus de‐
pends on relative symmetry in the information possessed by both
35 See, e.g, Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Crea‐
tion, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 287, 289 (2001)
(recognizing that both borrowers and lenders want liquidity, albeit for different rea‐
sons, and showing how banks can satisfy the demand on both sides in ways that direct
lending cannot); Bengt Holmström & Jean Tirole, Inside and Outside Liquidity 27
(2011) (providing a unified theory of the demand for liquidity based on the assumption
that firms are unable to pledge all of their returns to investors).
36 Gary Gorton et al., The Safe‐Asset Share, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 101, 104–05 (2012).
37 For further discussion of this challenge, see infra Section III.A.
38 See, e.g., Holmstrom, supra note 9, at 6 (explaining how a “blissful state of ‘sym‐
metric ignorance’” can create a “market . . . free of fears of adverse selection and there‐
fore very liquid”).
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parties, but the information‐gathering behavior that is required to
support the functioning of equity markets can actually inhibit the
functioning of money markets.39
As Holmstrom explains, “[A] state of ‘no questions asked’ is the
hallmark of money market liquidity; this is the way money markets
are supposed to look when they are functioning well.”40 Professor
Gary Gorton and others similarly suggest that the defining charac‐
teristic enabling a claim to function as money is that it is effectively
“information insensitive.” According to Gorton and Professor George
Pennacchi, one can define a “liquid security,” the critical feature of a
money claim, as one that “can be traded by uninformed agents,
without loss to insiders.”41
The information‐thin nature of money markets is supported and
accentuated by the institutions that underlie the production of mon‐
ey claims, just as the institutions that support equity markets pro‐
mote dissemination and analysis of information. While institutional
procedures vary,42 these institutions typically incorporate common
design features that make it unrewarding or costly for market par‐
ticipants to gather the information about the actual value of the as‐
sets underlying a money claim. As Holmstrom explains, “Opacity is a
natural feature of money markets.”43 Focusing on banks, Gorton sim‐
ilarly argues that “[t]he efficient use of these liabilities as money
necessarily entails eliminating informative financial markets,” and
this is what enables the money claims banks issue to be “accepted at
par.”44 In another work, Professors Dang, Holmstrom, and Gorton
show that debt is the optimal instrument to underlie money claims
because it is less sensitive to public or private information than eq‐
Id.
Id. at 2.
41 Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation,
45 J. Fin. 49, 50 (1990). This work builds on insights from an earlier work by Douglas
Gale and Martin Hellwig. See generally Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, Incentive‐
Compatible Debt Contracts: The One‐Period Problem, 52 Rev. Econ. Studies 647, 648
(1985).
42 Compare Subsection I.B.2 (describing how banks produce money claims) with Sec‐
tion II.A. (describing how shadow banks produce money claims).
43 Holmstrom, supra note 9, at 3.
44 Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking, 31 Yale J. on Reg. 825,
827 (2014) (emphasis added). See also Tri Vi Dang et al., Banks as Secret Keepers 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20255, 2014) (arguing that banks
are, and should be, opaque institutions).
39
40
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uity.45 As they point out, investors need not accept the strongest
claims regarding the benefits of ignorance to recognize the ad‐
vantages of structuring money claims to obviate the need for parties
to ever agree on the value of the underlying instruments, so long as
everything goes well.46
It is also important to recognize that short‐term refers to the na‐
ture of the commitment that a money claimant makes, not the na‐
ture of the relationship. Capital often sits in money claims for ex‐
tended periods. Individuals who place capital into a checking
account, for example, may make regular withdrawals, but they often
also make countervailing deposits. Similarly, institutional investors
who acquire asset‐backed commercial paper or provide capital
through a sale and repurchase agreement (“repo”) often roll over
those commitments when they nominally mature.
The modest stickiness of money claims during normal times is
important to parties on both sides of these relationships. For money
claimants, this reduces the need to evaluate options and regularly
make new decisions about which money claim to acquire. For the
institutions that issue money claims, this allows them to use capital
from money claims to fund longer‐term and less‐liquid assets. The
net effect is that money claims can provide a seemingly stable
source of financing most of the time. But at no point, even in a long‐
term relationship, must the holder of the money claim obtain accu‐
rate information about the value of the assets underlying that claim.
That money claims can exit quickly and at par underlies the other
distinctive feature of money markets—the inherent fragility of any
regime that relies on money claims and the potential for widespread
withdrawals to lead to value‐destroying fire sales and other system‐
ic disruptions.47 As Professors Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig
showed in the context of banks, coordination problems alone can
explain bank runs.48 Because money claims are usually backed by
45 Tri Vi Dang et al., Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises 3 (April 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Columbia University).
46 Id. at 4. It has long been recognized that one advantage of debt is that claims can be
satisfied without having to precisely assess the value of the firm or underlying assets.
See Gale & Hellwig, supra note 41; Robert M. Townsend, Optimal Contracts and Com‐
petitive Markets with Costly State Verification, 21 J. of Econ. Theory 265, 271 (1979).
47 Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 3, at 110.
48 Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquid‐
ity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401, 402 (1983).
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less‐liquid assets, if a large number of money claimants exercise
their right to exit simultaneously—a run—the entity issuing the
claims will have to sell assets at distressed fire‐sale prices, reducing
the value of claims not redeemed and giving all claimants an incen‐
tive to be first in line if they expect widespread withdrawals.49 Alt‐
hough there is good evidence that panics are not random and there
are competing accounts of the reasons for runs—a literature to
which this article contributes50—the inherent fragility of institutions
that rely on money claims is uncontested.51
This inherent fragility of money markets and the externalities that
arise when money claimants run help explain why most banking
systems are heavily regulated, as governments often feel compelled
to provide support during crisis periods regardless of whether they
have limited risk‐taking or imposed other regulations ex ante. At the
same time, runs are the aberration, not the norm. The informational
dynamics highlighted here shed light on the when and why of runs
and can provide an information‐based explanation for specific runs
that have, perhaps incorrectly, been characterized as “sunspots”
brought about by coordination problems.52
That money claimants prioritize certainty while equity holders
seek to maximize their risk‐adjusted returns does not mean that ei‐
ther group is indifferent to other attributes of the claims that they
hold. Equity holders also value liquidity and, holding all else equal,
money claimants prefer a slightly higher rate of return.53 Nonethe‐
less, as reflected in the growth of funds that limit exit rights, equity
claimants are often willing to forego liquidity in exchange for a
higher expected rate of return. Similarly, any variation in other
terms of money claims are always constrained by the overarching

See id.
See infra Section III.C.
51 See generally Kathryn Judge, The Importance of “Money,” 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1148,
1150 (2017) (book review) (noting that a defining characteristic of banks and many
shadow banks is reliance on short‐term debt to fund longer‐term liabilities, and this
system is inherently fragile).
52 See infra Sections III.C and IV.A.
53 See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, Yakov Amihud & Sreedhar T. Bharath, Liquidity Risk of
Corporate Bond Returns: Conditional Approach, 110 J. Fin. Econ. 358, 358 (2013); Ya‐
kov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid‐Ask Spread, 17 J. Fin. Econ.
223, 224 (1986).
49
50
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requirement that the claims be so low‐risk and short‐term that most
information would not affect the value of the claim.
This brief summary of the differences between equity and money
markets is descriptive, not normative. Just because adverse selec‐
tion can be overcome either through mechanisms that level up or
level down the informational playing field does not imply equiva‐
lence between the two approaches. Each has distinct advantages
and drawbacks.54 The aim here is merely to highlight the very dif‐
ferent conditions required to support the production and trading of
money and equity claims.
B. Two Sustainable Systems: Securities v. Banking Regulation
Between the Depression and the Crisis, financial markets in the
United States were remarkably stable and well‐functioning.55 The
banking system and the capital markets each suffered some set‐
backs, and banking and securities laws were revised accordingly,
but there were no major crises. As this Section shows, one reason
for this stability is that the regulatory regime governing each do‐
main was well‐suited to support the distinct informational needs
and incentives of the persons providing the capital that supported
the regime: Securities laws were suited to support equity markets,
as equity was the paradigmatic claim traded in the capital markets,
and banking law addressed the distinct needs of money claimants
who provide the bulk of capital on which banks rely.56
1. Securities Regulation
At the heart of U.S. securities regulation is a set of mandatory dis‐
closure obligations. Any firm that raises capital from the public must
commit to provide, on an ongoing basis, detailed information about

For a further discussion of both, see infra Part III.
See Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Meetings of the
Eastern Economic Association: The Great Moderation (Feb. 20, 2004) (describing how
output volatility “declined significantly between 1955 and 1970”); Gorton, Misunder‐
standing Financial Crises, supra note 32, at 4 (noting that during “the ‘Quiet Period’ in
U.S. history[,] the years 1934–2007 saw no systemic financial crises”).
56 The focus here is on how securities and bank regulation functioned prior to the rise
of the shadow banking system. For a discussion of how the rise of shadow banking has
changed these paradigms, see infra Section V.C.
54
55
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the firm’s operations and financial health.57 By making it easier for
investors to obtain timely information about a firm’s performance
and prospects, and by requiring that such information be provided
in a standardized form, these requirements promote informational
efficiency by reducing the costs that investors incur to obtain and
analyze pertinent information.58
These mandatory disclosure obligations are buttressed by rules
that impose liability for noncompliance and prohibit fraud and ma‐
nipulation.59 By reducing the costs investors would otherwise incur
verifying the accuracy and completeness of the information so dis‐
closed, these regulations further facilitate the dissemination of in‐
formation and promote informed trading.60 A third component of
U.S. securities regulation prohibits insider trading, limiting the abil‐
ity of management to profit from their superior access to infor‐
mation.61 Even these rules may support the processes through
which share prices come to contain information about a firm’s rela‐
tive value.62
57 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Hillary A. Sale & M. Todd Henderson, Securities Regulation:
Cases and Materials 157 (13th ed. 2015) (listing the information that a bank must regu‐
larly report).
58 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Dis‐
closure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 747 (1984) (explaining why even in an efficient
market “a case can still be made for a mandatory disclosure system”); Merritt B. Fox et
al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102
Mich. L. Rev. 331, 381 (2003) (providing empirical support for the notion “that the en‐
hanced disclosure requirements under the recently adopted Sarbanes‐Oxley Act may
bear real fruit in terms of the better functioning of the underlying economy” and “that
proposals to eliminate mandatory disclosure with reforms such as issuer choice of reg‐
ulatory regime should be approached with caution”).
59 Coffee et al., supra note 57, at 921.
60 E.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regu‐
lation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 714–15 (2006) [hereinafter Goshen & Parchomovsky, Securi‐
ties Regulation] (arguing that securities regulation does and should benefit “infor‐
mation traders, who specialize in gathering and analyzing general market and firm‐
specific information . . . . [and who] can best underwrite efficient and liquid capital
markets”).
61 Donald C. Langevoort, 18 Insider Trading: Regulation, Enforcement and Prevention
§§ 1:4, 6 (2014, rev. 2016).
62 See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 148 (1966); Zohar
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property
Rights in Information, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1234 (2001) (arguing that “analysts outper‐
form insiders in providing efficiency to both [information and capital] markets”); Go‐
shen & Parchomovsky, Securities Regulation, supra note 60, at 715 (arguing that secu‐
rities do and should favor information traders over insiders for a number of policy
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In contrast to many of the state securities law regimes in place
prior to the federalization of the securities laws in the early 1930s,
the federal regime does not ask, or even allow, regulators to make
any substantive judgments about the value of claims issued.63 In‐
stead, the role of securities regulators is to promulgate and enforce
rules that ensure investors have access to timely and accurate in‐
formation.64 As Professors John Coffee and Hillary Sale have ex‐
plained, “By culture and philosophy, the SEC is a disclosure regula‐
tor, whose concerns with risk and leverage are normally satisfied
once full disclosure is made.”65
There has been debate about the need for law to play the roles it
currently does in facilitating information dissemination, but even
those who question mandatory disclosure typically do so on the ba‐
sis that private institutions would suffice to ensure that information
is disclosed and compounded into share price.66 That share prices
contain information about the value of the claims traded and that it
is market participants, not regulators, who make the substantive as‐
sessments about the value of those claims is widely assumed and
expected.67 This assumption marries well with the nature of equity
claims: By giving holders significant downside and unlimited upside,
holders of equity claims can enhance their expected returns by gen‐
erating superior information about the value of those claims. Equity
claimants are thus strongly incentivized to engage in information
reasons, including the more competitive environment in which they operate relative to
insiders, the “economies of scale and scope in gathering and analyzing general market
and firm‐specific information” enjoyed by information traders and the “positive exter‐
nalities for the information market” and “reduc[tion in] corporate governance agency
cost[s]” their efforts generate). Other scholars have argued that prohibiting insider
trading reduces share price accuracy. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 861 (1983) (arguing that insid‐
er trading “may be an efficient way to compensate corporate managers”).
63 Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance 70 (3d ed. 2003).
64 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 707, 778 (2009).
65 Id. at 777–78.
66 E.g., George Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 132, 153 (1973); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 763, 856–57
(1995); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2373 (1998).
67 E.g., Gilson & Kraakman, MOME, supra note 24 .
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gathering and analysis, and they would be irrespective of the regula‐
tory regime. The regulatory regime works because it harnesses and
facilitates the preexisting incentives of equity claimants.
The net effect of the private and public forces at work in equity
markets is that at any point in time the price at which an equity
claim is trading contains significant information about its value rela‐
tive to other claims. This is why equity markets are often character‐
ized as being informationally efficient, at least on a relative basis,
most of the time.68 One ramification of this combination of comple‐
mentary institutions is that even an investor who does not under‐
take any due diligence can rely on the price to aggregate the differ‐
ent views of disparate, sophisticated traders about a firm’s expected
performance and other factors that could affect share value. Collec‐
tively, market structure and regulation thus work together to facili‐
tate a range of processes that encourage sophisticated investors to
gather and analyze information and enable other investors to piggy‐
back on the hard work of the sophisticates.
2. Bank Regulation
Bank regulation rests on an entirely different set of premises than
securities regulation and is undertaken by an entirely distinct group
of regulators. Whereas the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission have
primary responsibility for ensuring the integrity and functioning of
the capital markets, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptrol‐
ler of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) are the bank regulators in the United States. While securi‐
ties regulators are stereotyped as always favoring more disclosure
and strong enforcement, bank regulators are stereotyped as always
leaning toward confidentiality and underenforcement.69 Bank regu‐
lators are also regularly required to make the type of substantive,
judgment‐laden decisions that the securities regulatory regime allo‐
cates exclusively to market participants.

E.g., Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs, supra note 25, at 318.
See, e.g., Coffee & Sale, supra note 64, at 778 (“Instinctively, securities regulators
favor full disclosure and transparency, while banking regulators fear that adverse in‐
formation may alarm or panic investors and depositors, thereby causing a ‘run on the
bank.’”).
68
69
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Banking is among the most heavily regulated activities in which a
firm can engage.70 To become a bank, a firm must undergo an inten‐
sive chartering process.71 Thereafter, banks are subject to significant
limitations on the types of activities in which they can engage and
the types of assets they can hold. Traditionally, these restrictions
both limited the risks that banks could assume and facilitated the
ability of bank supervisors to understand those risks.72 All banks
and bank holding companies are also subject to an extensive over‐
sight regime. As reflected in the lengthy supervisory manuals issued
by each of the bank regulators, bank examiners regularly undertake
a close examination of virtually every aspect of a bank’s opera‐
tions.73 These processes provide bank regulators with a comprehen‐
sive picture of a bank’s operations and risk exposures.74 Bank regu‐
lators also have authority to address any deficiencies they detect
during the examination process. If a bank violates a statute or regu‐
lation or is engaged in other activities that threaten the bank’s safety
and soundness, bank regulators can obtain a cease and desist order,
impose civil monetary penalties, have employees and other affiliates
removed, and take other enforcement actions to address the issue.75
Also critical to this regime is the ability of bank regulators to close
a financially distressed bank.76 Bank regulators need not wait for a
bank to be insolvent or unable to pay its debts to force a bank into
70 Richard Carnell, Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Law of Financial Institu‐
tions 57 (5th ed. 2013) (“Banking is among the world’s most heavily regulated indus‐
tries.”).
71 Id. at 71–73 (describing the chartering process).
72 See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regula‐
tion in a Deregulatory Age, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 501, 520 (1989) (discussing the ability
of bank supervisors to develop expertise in one area as a result of confining banks to
particular activities); Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1262, 1264
(2013).
73 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Div. of Banking Supervision and Regula‐
tion, Commercial Bank Examination Manual (2016) (1881 pages; Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., Compliance Examination Manual I–1.1 (2016) (1261 pages).
74 Empirical evidence suggests that, at least temporarily, this process provides bank
regulators superior information about a bank’s financial health. See Judge, supra note
72, at 1270 and sources cited therein (discussing the unique resources afforded to bank
examiners and the advantages these resources provide).
75 Carnell et al., supra note 70, at 444–45 (examining the enforcement actions regula‐
tors can take against banks and their employees).
76 Id. at 244–45 (explaining that under 12 U.S.C. § 1831o, a bank faces increasingly
stringent treatment from regulators as its capitalization decreases. Pursuant to this
statute, regulators may place critically undercapitalized banks in receivership).
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receivership. Rather, they can close a bank on a range of bases that
suggest a bank is unlikely to regain its health.77 This regime gives
bank regulators significant authority to intervene if a bank does get
into trouble and further buttresses their authority to extract useful
information in connection with their examinations. Moreover, if a
bank’s primary regulator determines the bank should be closed, a
bank regulator—the FDIC—controls the receivership process.78
Overall, “[t]he FDIC enjoys a level of control that a dominant credi‐
tor could only dream of obtaining in bankruptcy.”79
The scope of this regime can largely be explained by the incen‐
tives of money claimants and the systemic ramifications of banking
panics. The massive regulatory regime governing banks makes it
easier for the money claimants who provide the great bulk of a
bank’s capital to remain only minimally informed. This is in part be‐
cause the government’s ongoing oversight reduces the need for de‐
positors to engage in comparable monitoring. Just as importantly,
oversight enables widespread deposit insurance, which significantly
curtails the downside risks to which most money claimants are ex‐
posed and makes them less likely to run.80 These programs benefit
depositors, who are now freed from having to engage in costly dili‐
gence, but they also benefit society more generally by reducing de‐
positors’ incentive to run, thus making a banking crisis less likely.
The extensive regulatory regime governing banks also facilitates
the government’s ability to respond appropriately during periods of
systemic distress. For example, to further discourage depositors
from panicking and to reduce the adverse consequences if they do,
qualified banks can readily access fresh liquidity from the Federal
Reserve’s discount window.81 By conditioning access to its primary
discount window on a bank’s confidential supervisory rating, the
Federal Reserve reduces the moral hazard that arises from such ac‐

77 Id. at 249 (discussing the example in which regulators may appoint a conservator
or receiver for an undercapitalized institution that fails to submit a timely and accepta‐
ble capital restoration plan).
78 E.g., Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankrupt‐
cy, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 985, 988–89 (2010) (describing the receivership process
that the FDIC controls).
79 Id. at 989.
80 Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 48, at 413, 416.
81 12 C.F.R. § 201.3 (2016).
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cess and the credit risk to which it is exposed.82 Similarly, if bank as‐
sets prove insufficient to justify the amount of information‐
insensitive capital on which they had come to rely—that is, if the
banking system is inadequately capitalized—the information pro‐
duced by the oversight regime can provide policymakers with in‐
formation about the costs and risks of closing or recapitalizing trou‐
bled institutions.
To be sure, banks also rely on nonmoney claims to fund their op‐
erations. Holders of equity and subordinated debt a bank issues, as
well as a bank’s other creditors, impose important market disci‐
pline, and there are informational benefits to regulatory strategies
that require a bank to increase such capital cushions.83 Banks are al‐
so subject to numerous disclosure requirements.84 Nonetheless,
banks are more opaque than other firms, and disclosure require‐
ments have lagged far behind the changing nature of banking.85 The
banking system historically may thus be understood as a regime
that limits the degree of information production that the providers
of capital need to undertake, and the limited private information
production counterbalances a supervisory regime that provides
bank regulators detailed information about, and control over, bank
activities.

82 Id. §§ 201.2–3. See infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the opacity of
banks).
83 Standards: Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements, 1 (Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision
2015)
available
at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d309.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KF5A‐PUZW] (“Market discipline has long been recognized as a key
objective of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision . . . . Pillar 3 of the Basel
framework aims to promote market discipline through regulatory disclosure require‐
ments”).
84 E.g., Regulation S‐K, item 801, Guide 3, reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) W
3827 (industry guide of additional disclosures required of all public bank holding com‐
panies); Fed. Financial Institutions Examination Council, Frequently Asked Questions,
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/Public/HelpFileContainers/FAQ.aspx [https://perma.cc/D4DB‐
B7EC] (describing Uniform Bank Performance Reports, or Call Reports).
85 E.g., Anne Beatty & Scott Liao, Financial Accounting in the Banking Industry: A Re‐
view of the Empirical Literature, 58 J. Acct. & Econ. 339, 342 (2014) (explaining that the
“asymmetric information paradigm has provided an explanation for both the useful‐
ness of accounting and the role of banks in the economy” and reviewing the relevant
literature); Mark J. Flannery et al., The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis and Opaqueness, J.
Fin. Intermediation 22, 67 (2013) (finding that during times of crisis, but not normal
times, large banks are more opaque than otherwise similar firms).
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The assurances that the government provides to persons holding
money claims issued by banks are not costless. Deposit insurance
and implicit guarantees give rise to moral hazard, reduce market‐
based discipline, and can result in significant government liabili‐
ties.86 There are also fewer mechanisms for checking errors and pro‐
tecting against biases and capture than in a market‐based regime.87
At the same time, the inherent fragility of any intermediation re‐
gime that issues money claims and the externalities that arise when
those fragilities become manifest are important considerations
when assessing the moral hazard and other drawbacks of regulating
banks so extensively. That runs by money claimants can have signif‐
icant adverse effects on the real economy curtails the capacity of the
government to credibly commit that they will not intervene to help
stop runs even without ex ante regulation. As reflected in the de‐
bates over “too big to fail,” failing to regulate does not eliminate
moral hazard and can create other challenges.88 The aforedescribed
banking regulatory regime that limited the creation of banks, im‐
posed significant restrictions on them, and created a large body of
regulators charged with monitoring bank activity was quite stable
for a remarkable length of time.89
The aim here is not to provide an exhaustive account of bank reg‐
ulation or securities regulation, but rather to highlight how key dif‐
ferences in the two regimes can be explained by the different infor‐
mation‐related incentives of the critical providers of capital. In the
capital markets, regulators’ primary role is to promote relative effi‐

86 Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9
FRBNY Econ. Pol’y Rev. 91, 97 (2003) (describing how FDIC insurance “gives the
shareholders and managers of insured banks incentives to engage in excessive risk‐
taking”).
87 E.g., Carnell et al., supra note 70, at 243 (examining the problem of regulatory for‐
bearance, which occurs when regulators “[fail] to take timely and appropriate action to
reduce the risk an unhealthy institution poses to the deposit insurance fund”); Rachel
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Using Institutional Design to Limit Agency Capture, 89
Tex. L. Rev. 15, 21–22 (2010) (describing how industry groups are better able to influ‐
ence regulators than their public counterparts because of the resources they can de‐
vote to monitoring agencies and contributing to political campaigns).
88 Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises, supra note 32, at 169–74 (discussing
costs of financial crises).
89 Id. at 4 (noting that no panics took place during the 1934–2007 “Quiet Period” and
arguing that the “Quiet Period shows that properly designed bank regulations can pre‐
vent financial crises for a significant period of time”).
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ciency and facilitate effective governance by reducing the costs that
market participants incur gathering pertinent information. At no
time are regulators making any substantive assessments regarding
the business models of the firms raising capital or the value of the
equity claims they issue. By contrast, it is the role of bank regulators
to gather significant information about banks’ assets and activities
and exercise judgment with respect to the riskiness of the activities
and value of those assets. Historically, bank regulators were aided in
these undertakings by rules that limited bank activities and invest‐
ments to ones regulators could readily understand.90
Juxtaposing these regimes also brings to the fore differences in
the relationship between when information is produced in each re‐
gime and when, if ever, that information becomes public. In both
domains, information about the value of firm assets and expected
future performance is constantly produced by persons who can dis‐
cipline firms in light of what they learn. In public equity markets,
this is an entirely public process, as the purchases and sales that
discipline a firm simultaneously move its share price. By contrast,
bank regulation occurs largely behind a shroud of confidentiality.
Bank regulators regularly assess multiple dimensions of each bank’s
operations and issue supervisory letters identifying areas for im‐
provement, but all of this information remains confidential, typically
indefinitely.91 This, again, is consistent with the notion that pruden‐
tial regulation seeks to obviate the need for smaller money claim‐
ants to have any information about the actual value of the assets un‐
derlying their claims, while securities regulation encourages and
facilitates the very due diligence and valuation efforts banking regu‐
lation discourages.
II. SHADOW BANKING
A. The Rise
The dramatic differences between the banking system and the
capital markets mattered little historically because each regime op‐
erated largely independent of the other. This started to change in
the 1970s with the rise of an array of market‐based mechanisms
Carnell et al., supra note 70, at 71–144.
Id. at 442 (explaining that “examination reports and examiners’ workpapers re‐
main confidential”).
90
91
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that collectively fulfill many of the economic functions long per‐
formed by banks. Today these mechanisms are known as the shad‐
ow banking system. In stark contrast to banks, which undertake the
full amount of liquidity and maturity transformation within individ‐
ual institutions, the shadow banking system accomplishes these un‐
dertakings through a series of interrelated market transactions and
structures which are often consummated at different points in time,
even though reliant on the others.92 The institutions that issue mon‐
ey claims are just a subset of these arrangements.93 Nonetheless, the
money claims issued by the shadow banking system are critical, as
the functioning of the overall system depends on capital that flows
through money claims.94 As the Crisis revealed all too vividly, when
money claimants make large‐scale withdrawals from shadow banks,
the effects are felt throughout the shadow banking system and
widespread market dysfunction often follows.95
That the Crisis emanated from the shadow banking system and
revealed that many of the money claims issued in that system were
less safe than holders previously believed did cause the system to
contract.96 Yet this contraction proved short‐lived. The shadow
banking system has since reestablished its pre‐Crisis size and is
poised for further growth.97 According to one measure, the size of
92 Francesca Carapella & David C. Mills, Information Insensitive Securities: The Bene‐
fits of Central Counterparties 23, 23 (March 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp‐content/uploads/2012/07/Carapella‐Francesca‐
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSX7‐6ZRK] (describing multilateral netting, the “agreed
offsetting of positions or obligations among three or more trading partners”).
93 While framed in slightly different terms, in other work, I show that the prolifera‐
tion of other core components of the shadow banking system pre‐Crisis—securitization
structures that bundled mortgages with other mortgages and then bundled securitized
assets with other securitized assets—also led to information gaps and thereby in‐
creased systemic risk. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 657, 690–97 (2012) [here‐
inafter Judge, Fragmentation Nodes].
94 Pozsar et al., supra note 3, at “The Shadow Banking System”(figure after the Ab‐
stract visually illustrating the position of money claims within the broader shadow
banking system).
95 See infra Part IV.
96 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 629–30.
97 See id. at 620 (noting “[s]hadow banking [sic] has also grown rapidly” between
2008 and 2011); Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report
2014, 8–9 (2014) (reporting shadow banking assets as a share of GDP rose by “six per‐
centage points to 120% of GDP in 2013, approaching the peak of 124% of GDP in
2007”).
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the worldwide shadow banking system currently stands at $75 tril‐
lion.98 The rapid growth of the shadow banking system has been
particularly pronounced in the United States, the only country
where the shadow banking system is larger than the regulated
banking sector.99
The importance of the shadow banking system in the United
States is reflected in the declining importance of regulated banks. In
1970, commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions col‐
lectively held 54.41% of the assets in the financial sector, roughly
the same amount they had held a decade earlier.100 That figure fell to
just 24.22% by 2005.101 Other metrics tell a similar story. For exam‐
ple, in 1980, banks provided the great bulk of the capital used to
fund home loans; by 1990, market‐based sources of capital (i.e.,
shadow banking) had roughly caught up with banks; and, by 2009,
the value of home loans financed through the capital markets was
more than twice the value of home loans financed by banks.102 These
figures may overstate the decline of banks, as implicit and explicit
guarantees from banks played a critical role supporting the shadow
banking system, but they accurately convey how shadow banks are
overtaking banks as providers of money claims and providers of
capital for productive undertakings.103
The reasons for this growth remain incompletely understood.104 It
is clear that this system could not exist but for an array of legal and
financial innovations that enabled new methods of pooling and the
issuance of new types of financial claims. Given the economic equiv‐
alence between much of what the shadow banking system accom‐
plishes and the functions long served by the banking system, regula‐
tory arbitrage is clearly among the driving forces. Yet, there are also
98 E.g., Financial Stability Board, supra note 97, at 2; Sam Fleming, Shadow Banking
Nears Pre‐Crisis Peak as Regulation Hits Mainstream Lenders, Fin. Times (Oct. 30,
2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/71f5fd1e‐6045‐11e4‐98e6‐
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cYaMzYmM.
99 Financial Stability Board, supra note 97, at 11, Exhibit 3.1.
100 Korkut Ertürk & Gökçer Özgür, The Decline of Traditional Banking and Endoge‐
nous Money, in Banking, Monetary Policy and Political Economy of Financial Regula‐
tion: Essays in Honor of Jane Webb D’Arista 275, 278, Table 14.1 (Gerald Epstein,
Thomas Schlesinger & Matias Vernengo eds., 2014).
101 Id.
102 Adrian & Shin, supra note 5, at 3, Figure 4.
103 Pozsar et al., supra note 3, at 2.
104 See infra Section IV.B.

INFORMATION GAPS 3.15.17 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Information Gaps and Shadow Banking

3/22/2017 10:15 AM

129

indicia that the system has grown in part to satisfy demands that the
banking system cannot address.105 In particular, recent empirical
work shows a strong demand for money claims in amounts that the
banking system cannot readily produce.106 Apple, Inc., for example,
currently has over $237 billion in “cash equivalents” that it needs to
park somewhere.107 Particularly in an era in which policymakers are
seeking to ensure that no bank is “too big to fail,” banks are not suit‐
ed to produce money claims in the amounts required to satisfy the
needs of Apple, other large firms, and institutional investors. Recent
work by Professor Zoltan Pozsar shows how the global savings glut,
whereby U.S. Treasuries and similar assets are in short supply in the
United States because of foreign demand for such assets, coupled
with the increasingly sophisticated cash management systems used
by firms and institutional investors, is contributing to the mismatch
between the demand for safe assets like money claims and assets
that are inherently safe without the credit enhancement devices
used in shadow banking.108 In short, while still incompletely under‐
stood, the shadow banking system appears to be playing important
economic functions in today’s financial system, including a number
that could not readily be satisfied in other ways.

Id. and sources cited therein.
E.g., Gorton et al., supra note 36, at 103, 105, Figure 2 (showing “that the demand
for safe or information‐insensitive debt exceeds the supply of US Treasuries outstand‐
ing”); Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. Bank‐
ing System, 22 Fin. Markets, Institutions, & Instruments 283, 284 (2013) (finding that
“between 2003 and 2008, institutional cash pools’ demand for insured deposit alterna‐
tives [i.e., money claims] exceeded the outstanding amount of short‐term government
guaranteed instruments not held by foreign official investors by . . . at least $1.5 trillion”
and probably far more).
107 Christine Wang, Apple’s Cash Hoard Swells to $237.6 billion, a Record, CNBC.com
(Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/25/apples‐cash‐hoard‐now‐nearly‐
238‐billion.html [https://perma.cc/3H9E‐DXE4] (“Apple’s enormous cash hoard grew
to $237.6 billion in the fiscal fourth quarter, up $6.1 billion from the previous quar‐
ter.”).
108 Pozsar, supra note 106, at 284 (finding that “between 2003 and 2008, institutional
cash pools’ demand for insured deposit alternatives [i.e., money claims] exceeded the
outstanding amount of short‐term government guaranteed instruments not held by
foreign official investors by . . . at least $1.5 trillion” and probably far more).
105
106
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B. Information in the Shadow Banking System
1. Money Claims
One way the shadow banking system resembles the banking sys‐
tem is that much of the capital flowing into the regime—while sub‐
sequently channeled through layers of complex arrangements—
enters via the issuance of money claims.109 The money claims issued
in the shadow banking system share the same general characteris‐
tics of all money claims described above—they are structured to be
sufficiently low‐risk and short‐term that holders need not engage in
meaningful due diligence. They are also akin to the money claims is‐
sued by banks in that the assets backing the claims are longer‐term,
less‐liquid investments, and the claims are structured to obviate the
need for the parties to agree on the value of the underlying assets at
any stage in the relationship.
Often, but far from always, money market mutual funds interme‐
diate the creation of money claims in the shadow banking system.
Money market mutual funds, which first appeared in the United
States in 1970, held total assets of approximately $3.8 trillion by
2008.110 Unlike most mutual funds, money market mutual funds are
subject to stringent regulatory restrictions on the types of assets
they can hold, many of which are themselves money claims.111 In ex‐
change for abiding by these restrictions, money market mutual
funds traditionally were allowed to report a share price of exactly
one dollar under most circumstances.112 This regime intentionally
reduced price accuracy, yet it worked remarkably well for an ex‐
tended period of time. Prior to the Crisis, only one money market
109 Pozsar et al., supra note 3, at “The Shadow Banking System” (figure after the Ab‐
stract visually illustrating the position of money claims within the broader shadow
banking system). =
110 Money
Market Fund Reform, SEC Release No. IC‐28807 5 (2009),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/ic‐28807.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6CJ‐
NLYA] (citing Investment Company Institute, Trends in the Fees and Expenses of Mutu‐
al Funds, 2008 (Apr. 2009), http://www.ici.org/highlights/trends_04_09).Master:
spacing}
111 Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76–768, 54 § Stat. 789, 789 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a‐1–80a‐64 (2012)); SEC Money Market Funds, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.2a‐7 (2016).
112 Money market mutual funds achieve this by using the amortized cost of the assets
they hold, declaring daily dividends for interest earned and rounding to the closest
penny. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a‐7.
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mutual fund, and a small one at that, had ever redeemed shares at
less than one dollar per share.113
Looking past and within money market mutual funds reveals oth‐
er institutional arrangements that enable the creation of money
claims outside of banks. Overcollateralization, the use of highly rat‐
ed (and often securitized) assets as collateral, and backup commit‐
ments from issuers and sponsors are all devices deployed—often in
conjunction with one another—to assure money claimants that the
issuer would be able to redeem their claims at par. One reason that
these devices are so useful is that they expand, significantly, the ca‐
pacity of the nonbank financial system to issue claims that are in‐
sensitive to most information.
Asset‐backed commercial paper (“ABCP”), a common type of
money claim pre‐Crisis, illustrates how this works. A common struc‐
ture for creating ABCP started with a bank or other type of financial
institution creating a bankruptcy‐remote entity. That entity would
hold relatively long‐term and often securitized assets, like mort‐
gage‐backed securities and collateralized loan obligations, which
would be funded through the issuance of ABCP, which typically had
very short maturities and some longer‐term securities.114 This ar‐
rangement was often supported by explicit or implicit commitments
by the sponsoring bank to provide the entity liquidity support if
needed, and sometimes there was also an expectation that the spon‐
sor would provide credit support if required to protect the value of
the ABCP issued.115 The holders of the ABCP issued were not entire‐
Id.
Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, Fed. Reserve, Staff Rep. No. 580, Shadow Bank‐
ing: A Review of the Literature, 6 (2012) (“The maturity of ABCP is between one and
180 days . . . .”); Daniel M. Covitz et al., The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of
the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Market, 68 J. Fin. 815, 824 (2013) (noting in 2007,
“average maturity of new‐issue paper dropped to about 21 days on average in the last 5
months of 2007, from 33 days on average in the first 7 months of the year”) Just as in
the banking system, the need for information‐sensitive, loss‐bearing capital to support
the issuance of money claims creates a friction on the rate of money creation and re‐
sults in some information production, but that alone does not suffice for stability.
115 Adrian & Ashcroft, supra note 114, at 5–6. See also Viral V. Acharya et al., Securiti‐
zation Without Risk Transfer, 107 J. Fin. Econ. 515, 516 (2013) (finding that “the crisis
had a profoundly negative effect on commercial banks because banks had (in large
part) insured outside investors in ABCP by providing explicit guarantees to conduits,
which required banks to pay off maturing ABCP at par”); Bank for Int’l Settlements, Re‐
port on Special Purpose Entities 2–3 (2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7AGD‐8TSA] (explaining that “high risk retention (implying a need
113
114
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ly ignorant; they were not willing to acquire the ABCP without
meaningful assurances that it was exceptionally low risk. Yet the in‐
formation they relied on to make that determination, such as the
credit ratings of the securitized assets held by the issuing entity and
the degree of over‐collateralization, were proxies that are probative
but imperfect indicators of credit risk. The costs of acquiring more
accurate, first‐hand information about the value of the assets under‐
lying their claims were prohibitively expensive in light of the nature
of the claims they were holding.116 That holders were only minimally
informed does not mean that they were naïve or dumb. They were
willing to rely on probative but imperfect proxies of actual credit
risk because they enjoy the other privilege that holders of money
claims always enjoy—the ability to walk away at par.
Just as in the banking system, the capacity of the persons supply‐
ing capital to walk away, quickly, at any sign of trouble is a mixed
blessing. The short‐term nature of the commitment enables a dis‐
tinct form of discipline, one that is sometimes optimal.117 And, like
the free banking era, the vibrancy of the shadow banking system at‐
tests to the capacity of a wholly private regime to create viable
money claims.118 Yet, one reason that banks are now so heavily
regulated is that the incentives of individual money claimants often
deviate substantially from those that are socially optimal. The same
walk‐away rights that enable money claimants to rationally remain
only minimally informed simultaneously render any system that re‐
lies heavily on money claims inherently fragile. And when money
claimants exercise their exit rights en masse, value‐destroying fire
sales and other adverse systemic repercussions often follow.
2. Beyond Money Claims
A brief look at how the capital flowing through money claims
funds longer‐term projects brings into relief the distinct information
dynamics at play in the shadow banking system. Recall that, in the
for potential credit support on the part of the sponsor or originator) is generally more
likely with programs such as . . . certain ABCP conduits”).
116 Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 115, at 34 (“There was little independent
due diligence undertaken by a large portion of the investor community into the SPEs in
which they invested . . . .”).
117 E.g., Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 34, at 497.
118 Carnell et al., supra note 70, at 20–22.
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banking system, liquidity transformation and maturity transfor‐
mation occur entirely within a single firm. In contrast, shadow bank‐
ing achieves that same degree of liquidity and maturity transfor‐
mation through multiple layers of interconnected, market‐based
structures. Starting with the description just provided, money mar‐
ket mutual funds would obtain capital by issuing shares. The money
market mutual fund would then acquire ABCP and other financial
claims that are sufficiently short‐term and sufficiently safe that they
often are themselves money claims, and that capital in turn would
enable the issuing entity to hold asset‐backed securities (“ABS”).
Those ABS are, in turn, the product of a securitization transaction
that enabled the capital from various tranches of ABS issued to be
used to acquire underlying credit instruments.
ABCP conduits and ABS structures are both examples of fragmen‐
tation nodes.119 Fragmentation nodes are structures that bundle fi‐
nancial claims, such as home loans or securitized assets, together
and then divvy out rights to the cash flows from those assets to var‐
ious classes of claimholders.120 Fragmentation nodes enable the in‐
herently risky and longer‐term loans that borrowers require to be
repackaged into assets that have less credit risk, are shorter in dura‐
tion or are otherwise more liquid than the underlying loans. In mak‐
ing it possible for these types of transformations to occur outside
the banking system, fragmentation nodes are critical to shadow
banking. No magic is required. So long as the underlying assets are
diverse and their performance is imperfectly correlated, the process
of pooling existing assets and issuing different tranches of new in‐
struments can facilitate credit, liquidity and maturity transfor‐
mation. The pervasiveness of fragmentation nodes in today’s finan‐
cial landscape can be attributed, at least in part, to the way such
structures enable risks to be redistributed among different classes
of holders in accordance with their relative capacity to bear particu‐
lar risks.
At the same time, the spread of fragmentation nodes and the oth‐
er support mechanisms that enable the issuance of money claims in
the shadow banking system dramatically increase the range of in‐
formation potentially pertinent to the value of the financial instru‐

119
120

Judge, Fragmentation Nodes, supra note 93, at 659.
Id.
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ments created in that system and the health of the financial institu‐
tions operating within it. The value of an ABS, for example, depends
not only on the quality of the underlying loans, but also on factors
that are specific to the securitization structure issuing that ABS,
such as the correlation among the underlying assets and the con‐
tractual terms determining how interest and principal paid on the
underlying assets will be allocated to the various classes of securi‐
ties issued.121 Prior to the creation of the securitization structure,
these were not pertinent to anyone.122 The relationship between the
degree of correlation among the underlying assets and the value of a
newly created ABS also varies significantly across the different
tranches of ABS issued. As a result, the interests of the investors
who acquire the lower rated tranches, which are information sensi‐
tive, do not align with the interests of the holders of the AAA‐
tranche that typically back money claims.123 That the expected re‐
turn on the underlying assets may be more correlated than assumed
in the model used to create the securitization structure, for example,
is information that would adversely affect the values of the AAA‐
tranche while increasing the value of the lowest tranches. This is an
example of information that no one involved had both the incentive
and means to produce at the time a securitization transaction was
consummated. It also explains why the presence of some informed,
loss‐bearing capital in the shadow banking system does not suffice
to counteract the ignorance of money claimants.
ABCP programs and many of the other entities that issue money
claims are also fragmentation nodes. They similarly bundle together
assets that previously had no connection to one another and issue
claims that have different rights with respect to the cash flows from
the underlying assets. As with ABS, the process of creating such
fragmentation nodes can create value by facilitating liquidity and
For a more thorough explanation of these dynamics, see id. at 678–81.
To be sure, the correlation between the expected performance of a mortgage and
the expected performance of the overall market mattered with respect to the pricing of
that mortgage, and if, as was sometimes but not always the case, the mortgages pack‐
aged into a securitization structure were all originated by the same bank, then that
bank would care about the correlation among their expected returns. In each instance,
however, the reference group would be a much larger and more diverse group of as‐
sets. The importance of the correlation among the specific mortgages placed together
into a securitization structure is contingent on the creation of that structure.
123 Judge, Fragmentation Nodes, supra note 93, at 693–94.
121
122
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maturity transformation. But, again, it is a process that makes fac‐
tors that were once not relevant to anyone or anything, like the cor‐
relation among the underlying assets and the circumstances in
which the sponsoring bank will provide support to the program,
highly pertinent to the value of the ABCP and other instruments cre‐
ated to fund the program.
These information dynamics and the structure of ABCP programs
also demonstrate the ways complexity and ignorance may some‐
times promote market functioning. For the reasons just described,
the securitized assets underlying the ABCP were often exceptionally
complex.124 The complexity of the assets underlying many ABCP
programs not only made it uneconomical for the ABCP holders to
engage in the due diligence required to produce private information
about the value of those assets, it also made it exceptionally costly
for the sponsoring banks to produce such information. This likely
helped convince ABCP holders that the sponsoring bank had not un‐
dertaken those efforts and thus did not have superior information
about the quality of the assets that it could use, to the detriment of
the ABCP holders.125 The complexity thus may have enhanced the
capacity of the ABCP issued to operate like money by reducing the
probability of adverse selection.126
C. Information Gaps
Juxtaposing this brief glimpse of the money markets that feed the
shadow banking system and the plumbing that enables that system
to create money claims with the regulatory architecture set forth in
Part I reveals a core informational challenge. Because the shadow
banking system operates in the capital markets, to the extent these
activities are regulated at all, the default rules governing their oper‐
ation come from securities regulation. The default regulatory regime
is thus one that presupposes claimants who are incentivized to en‐

124 See, e.g., Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises, supra note 32, at 50 (“The
structure of asset‐backed securities can be very complicated and opaque. The idea is
that they make good collateral because of their lack of secrets.”).
125 Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises, supra note 32, at 50 (explaining how
before the 2007–2008 financial crisis, ABCP frequently used asset‐backed securities
with complex and opaque structures as collateral).
126 Id. at 49–50.
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gage in meaningful information gathering and analysis.127 The mar‐
ket and payoff structures for money claims, however, provide no
reward for acquiring superior information. Like bank deposits, the
money claims produced by shadow banks are structured to obviate
the need for the holder to have high‐quality information about the
value of the underlying assets at any stage in the relationship. By
examining the incentives of the persons providing a significant
swath of the capital flowing into the shadow banking system and the
structures that populate that system against the default regulatory
regime governing this system, this analysis reveals that there are
structural reasons to expect significant information gaps in the
shadow banking system.
The shadow banking system enables the growth of large infor‐
mation gaps, in part, because the value of the information that re‐
sides in those gaps varies significantly in different states of the
world. The identified information gaps typically have little adverse
impact on market functioning so long as confidence reigns—and
may even facilitate it—but the ramifications of these gaps change
precipitously if that confidence begins to wane.128 Post‐Crisis re‐
forms have mitigated, but are far from eliminating, these dynam‐
ics.129
Another insight that arises from examining shadow banking
against the background regulatory architecture and the infor‐
mation‐related incentives of the providers of capital is that there
may be structural reasons to expect far greater complexity in the
shadow banking system than in either banks or the capital markets
as historically constituted. A core component of traditional bank
regulation entailed limitations on banks’ activities and investments.
The complexity‐limiting effect of these regulations was a critical
component enabling bank regulators to understand the risks to
which banks were exposed. Similarly, a sophisticated investor ac‐
quiring a financial claim as an investment will typically be wary of
any product that is too complex for him to understand, which tradi‐
127 To be clear, much of shadow banking falls into exemptions built into the securities
laws, but the need to fit into those exemptions is an important way that securities laws
affect shadow banking, and the contours of those exemptions can be explained in much
the same terms as the rationales for the overall regime.
128 See infra Parts III and IV.
129 See infra Part V.
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tionally limited the complexity of instruments trading in the capital
markets. As a result, the regulatory and market forces that ensured
someone had high‐quality information about the value of assets and
their associated risks simultaneously operated to limit the complexi‐
ty of the instruments created. These limitations were never perfect
and they appear to have become potentially much weaker over
time,130 yet shadow banks operate in an entirely different paradigm.
In the shadow banking system, even under normal circumstances,
there are often few or no market‐based or regulatory forces limiting
the complexity of the claims created, and that complexity may even
facilitate liquidity in some states of the world. This is relevant to the
analysis here, as the degree of complexity directly affects the size of
information gaps that are likely to arise and the cost of filling those
gaps should subsequent events require them to be filled.131
III. THE NEW INFORMATIONAL CHALLENGE
Framed in terms of information, the existing regulatory apparatus
was designed to support two distinct regimes: a banking system that
enables most providers of capital to remain minimally informed and
mitigates the associated systemic risk and potential moral hazard
through a massive regulatory regime; and, separately, a capital mar‐
kets regime that relies on capital providers who are incentivized to
gather and analyze information wherein the primary role of regula‐
tion is to reduce the costs of those efforts. The shadow banking sys‐
tem does not fit either paradigm.
This mismatch and the information gaps that arise from this mis‐
match give rise to a range of policy issues. The remainder of the
analysis will focus on an important subset of those issues—how the
information gaps that arise from shadow banking affect fragility.
This Part explains the shortcoming in existing frames for analyzing
the production and distribution of information that is filled by iden‐
tifying information gaps. It then explores the relationship between
information and market functioning before developing this Article’s
claim—that information gaps contribute to the systemic risk arising
from shadow banking and are an important independent mecha‐

130
131

See infra Section V.C.
See infra Section III.C.
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nism contributing to the fragility of institutions that rely on money
claims. Part IV tests this claim against evidence from the Crisis.
A. Information Gaps in Context
Economists and other experts have long recognized that infor‐
mation and lack of information can have profound implications for
market functioning. Much of the analysis thus far rests upon the rich
literature addressing these dynamics. To grossly oversimplify, that
literature tends to operate within one of two frameworks: one fo‐
cused on how information is distributed within a system and a se‐
cond focusing on the nature of information that is missing.
Current understandings of the importance of how information is
distributed among parties often build on Akerlof’s insight that when
information is distributed asymmetrically and buyers rely on “some
market statistic to judge the quality of prospective purchases,”
sellers have an “incentive . . . to market poor quality merchan‐
dise.”132 Buyers, anticipating this adverse selection, discount what
they are willing to pay accordingly, with the net result that no trade
will take place even when an exchange would be welfare enhanc‐
ing.133
Other scholars have shown that modest asymmetries in how in‐
formation is distributed among parties can positively impact market
functioning. A central insight in Gilson and Kraakman’s original
analysis of the mechanisms of market efficiency is that it is only
when “prices do not disclose all information” that there can “be an
‘equilibrium degree of disequilibrium’ somewhere short of full effi‐
ciency” that enables sophisticated investors to profit from engaging
in costly information gathering and analysis even in relatively effi‐
cient capital markets.134 Coffee’s work on gatekeepers, such as ac‐
countants and credit rating agencies, similarly reveals how the abil‐
ity for such parties to profit from superior information about the
Akerlof, supra note 17, at 488.
Id. at 490–91. According to Google Scholar, 36,700 subsequent academic works
cite
Akerlof’s
classic
article.
Google
Scholar,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?espv=2&biw=1241&bih=750&bav=on.2,or.&bvm=
bv.96041959,d.b2w&ion=1&um=1&ie=UTF‐8&lr&cites=8622278700871890196
[https://perma.cc/H9MC‐8NLJ] (last visited July 1, 2015).
134 Gilson & Kraakman, MOME, supra note 24, at 623 (using this to explain why San‐
ford Grossman’s efficiency paradox is not a paradox in practice).
132
133
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financial health or other characteristics of an issuer plays a critical
role in compensating them for the costly effort of producing that in‐
formation.135 Much of the literature explaining the rationales for
mandating disclosure in securities markets and prohibiting activi‐
ties like insider trading similarly shed light on how the distribution
of information affects market functioning, and how market structure
and other institutional arrangements can promote and blunt incen‐
tives to produce information that is disaggregated or otherwise not
yet known.136
A separate vein in the literature shifts the focus from how infor‐
mation is dispersed among parties within the system to the nature
of information that is missing. Much of this work builds on the risk‐
uncertainty dichotomy first articulated by Knight nearly a century
ago.137 As Knight explains, “The . . . difference between the two cate‐
gories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former, the distribution of
the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through calcu‐
lation a priori or from statistics of past experience).”138 By contrast,
“true uncertainty” is “not susceptible to measurement.”139 This dis‐
tinction has profound implications for decision‐making. As Knight
further explained, unknowns that represent risks can be “converted
to effective certainty” by insurance and similar schemes that group
similar instances together and enable individuals to pay a risk‐
adjusted fee to mitigate adverse outcomes.140 The same mechanisms
are not available to mitigate the effects of unknown unknowns.
While Knight assumed markets to be more complete than they
are, his core insight remains relevant and influential. Economists
and others regularly invoke the notion of Knightian uncertainty as a
way of acknowledging the inevitability of unknowable unknowns.141
135 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 1–8
(2006).
136 See supra Subsection I.B.2 and sources cited therein.
137 Knight, supra note 18.
138 Id. at 233.
139 Id. at 232.
140 Id. at 46.
141 Knight recognizes that because of uniqueness, there is some irreducible uncer‐
tainty, but his analysis is largely framed by reference to a particular market actor, and
his initial framing treats risk as a changing subset of uncertainty. See Knight, supra note
18, at 233–63. For further discussion on gaps between Knight’s original analysis and
ways the notion of Knightian uncertainty are typically employed, see, for example,
Geoffrey T.F. Brooke, Uncertainty, Profit and Entrepreneurial Action: Frank Knight’s
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There is now a rich body of literature, much of it building off of a
thought experiment by Professor Daniel Ellsberg, examining how
uncertainty affects decision‐making, which establishes that individ‐
uals tend to be “ambiguity‐averse,” and explores the ramifications of
that tendency in an array of settings.142 A number of efforts to better
understand the causes of the Crisis similarly identify uncertainty as
a significant factor contributing to its depth.143
Each of these frames and other bodies of inquiry that have
evolved alongside them enhance our ability to understand the dy‐
namics here at issue, yet none provide an easy way to delineate sit‐
uations where the relevant information is theoretically knowable or
otherwise conducive to measurement but not actually known by any
party. Implicit in the notion of an information asymmetry is that
someone has the information. Information asymmetries can impede
market functioning if the probability of adverse selection is too
great, but trading on superior information is how private market ac‐
tors profit from that information. Thus, so long as someone has the
information, that information will usually be revealed, even if indi‐
rectly, and the market will move toward a new equilibrium that in‐
corporates that information.
The situation changes significantly when pertinent information is
not fully known to any party in the system. Market participants
Contribution Reconsidered, 32 J. Hist. Econ. Thought 221, 223–24 (2010); Itzhak Gilboa
et al., Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling, 22 J. Econ. Persp. 173, 173–74
(2008); Stephen F. Leroy & Larry D. Singell, Knight on Risk and Uncertainty, 95 J. Pol.
Econ. 394, 394 (1987). Formal analyses of contracting and other forms of decision‐
making have found ways to minimize the importance of Knightian uncertainty by in‐
troducing the notion of “subjective probability.” Larry G. Epstein & Jiankang Zhang,
Subjective Probabilities on Subjectively Unambiguous Events, 69 Econometrica 265,
266 (2001).
142 See generally Talley, supra note 18, at 763–71 (citing Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambi‐
guity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. Econ. 643 (1961)) (providing an overview of this
literature and Ellsberg’s influence).
143 See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. Comp. Econ. 315, 318
(2013) (“[P]re‐determined, binding, non‐negotiable legal commitments can hasten a
financial crisis and in the extreme case the financial system’s demise.”). See also Ricar‐
do J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Collective Risk Management in a Flight to
Quality Episode, 63 J. Fin. 2195, 2197 (2008) (examining how an increase in uncertain‐
ty can generate flight to quality effects); Viral V. Acharya, Douglas Gale & Tanju
Yorulmazer, Rollover Risk and Market Freezes 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15674, 2009) (providing an account of market freezes that de‐
pends, in part, on “uncertainty about credit risk of the underlying asset . . . not be[ing]
fully revealed by the date of next rollover”).
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must make a threshold determination of whether to engage in the
requisite data gathering and analyzing before they can engage in in‐
formed trading. The higher the costs the less often it will be rational
for them to incur these threshold expenses.144 The government simi‐
larly cannot make credible signals about information it lacks, and it
cannot accurately price insurance‐like information substitutes.145
Situations where no party has pertinent information thus pose chal‐
lenges that are different in kind than the ones that arise when in‐
formation is asymmetrically distributed among market participants
or regulators.
When no party has relevant information, the gap that results op‐
erates like an unknown unknown. Information gaps thus increase
the effective uncertainty in any system. Yet these gaps do not fit
neatly into the dichotomy promulgated by Knight. Knightian uncer‐
tainty is generally an exogenous variable outside of anyone’s capaci‐
ty to control. By contrast, when pertinent information is knowable
but lacking, policymakers and market participants can undertake
activities that reduce those gaps. Delineating situations where miss‐
ing information is knowable from other types of uncertainty is thus
a critical threshold step to understanding the private and public
mechanisms available when the challenge is one of unknowns.
One reason for this conceptual gap and the minimal attention that
has been paid to information that is knowable but unknown may be
that information gaps can only be identified through structural
analyses of the type performed in Parts I and II. Analyses that focus
on the parties to a transaction—the focal point of most studies of fi‐
nancial and other forms of contracting—or that examine the nature
of pertinent but missing information are never going to identify this
type of information dynamic. Accentuating the challenge is that this
type of structural analysis will typically be an inductive exercise that
requires probabilistic inferences. It is rarely possible to establish
with certitude that particular information was not actually known to
any party, private or public, at any juncture in a large and complex
intermediation regime. This does not mean empirical evidence is ir‐
relevant. Part IV undertakes a close analysis of how this Article’s
claims regarding the existence of information gaps and their effects

144
145

Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs, supra note 25. See also infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.C.

INFORMATION GAPS 3.15.17 (DO NOT DELETE)

142

Virginia Law Review

3/22/2017 10:15 AM

[Vol. 103:nnn

on market functioning comport with the data available about how
market participants actually behaved at critical points during the
Crisis. Nonetheless, these challenges help to explain why this im‐
portant category of information dynamics has not been identified
and examined more closely until now.
B. Incomplete Information and Market Functioning
To understand why information gaps matter, it is helpful to re‐
view what we already know about the relationship between infor‐
mation and market functioning. As reflected in the disparate as‐
sumptions animating securities and bank regulation, however, there
is no universal “we” in this space. This Section, accordingly, creates
the required common ground. It identifies four core understandings
that build upon one another and lay the foundation for this Article’s
contributions regarding the importance of information gaps.
A threshold issue, which is often misunderstood, is that lack of in‐
formation does not necessarily impose any friction on market func‐
tioning. This is illustrated in the stylized used‐car market made fa‐
mous by Akerlof’s work on how information asymmetries can
inhibit efficient transfers. The reason Akerlof focused on used
cars—rather than new cars—is that even though the cars for sale in
both markets entail a mix of cherries and lemons, a dealer selling
new cars is not assumed to possess private information about the
categorization of any particular vehicle.146 In Akerlof’s analysis,
whether a car is a lemon could be known only with extended use.147
And so long as a new car dealer does not possess superior infor‐
mation about whether a vehicle is a lemon, he has no ability to dis‐
criminate on that basis.
When information is lacking, rather than asymmetrically distrib‐
uted, both the buyer and seller can use probabilistic estimates to
gauge the likelihood that a particular vehicle is a lemon, and both
can discount the expected value of a vehicle accordingly.148 Ex post,
the utility that the buyer enjoys will depend on whether he receives

Akerlof, supra note 17, at 489.
Id.
148 Id.
146
147
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a lemon or cherry, but that fact should not inhibit the transfer.149
While a stylized car market is quite different from today’s financial
markets, this simple example reflects a fundamental point—mutual
ignorance is just as effective as mutual understanding at preventing
adverse selection.
In many markets beyond new cars, functioning depends on mar‐
ket participants not having all pertinent information, and there are
benefits from this type of market structure. Mutual ignorance can
facilitate the provision of liquidity and can be critical to sustaining
pooling equilibria.150 Moreover, because information gathering and
analysis is costly and sometimes socially wasteful, there can be wel‐
fare gains from market structures that reduce the need for such ac‐
tivities.151 These benefits and the cost of producing information lead
to the second building block—the level of information production
that will be optimal in a given market cannot be determined in the
abstract. There may well be market structures that are viable but
149 While not the focus of Akerlof’s analysis, there are also a variety of contractual
tools, like warranties, that a dealer who sells a high volume of new cars could more
readily deploy in order to signal quality and to divorce the transfer of the car from the
anticipated costs that will arise if it is a lemon.
150 E.g., Michael J. Fishman & Jonathan A. Parker, Valuation, Adverse Selection, and
Market Collapses, 28 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2575, 2576 (2015) (finding that “[t]he private
beneﬁts to valuation exceed its social beneﬁts so that, when both are possible, the equi‐
librium without valuation is always more efﬁcient than the equilibrium with valuation
is.”); Holmstrom, supra note 9, at 12–15 (noting that “[i]ntentional opacity is a rather
ubiquitous phenomenon” and describing a wide array of markets that use structures
that rely on limited access to information); André Stenzel & Wolf Wagner, Opacity and
Liquidity (Ctr. Econ. and Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP10665, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2621569
[https://perma.cc/G4KH‐CCVA] (formally modeling why “it can be (privately and so‐
cially) optimal to issue opaque assets such as to deter information acquisition” and that
“[i]t can even be desirable to artificially increase an asset’s opacity beyond its natural
level”); Carapella & Mills, supra note 92, at 36–37 (arguing “information insensitivity is
desirable because it allows trades to occur easily”) (emphasis in original). The im‐
portance of pooling equilbria is also discussed frequently in the literature on insurance.
151 E.g., David Andolfatto et al., Optimal Disclosure Policy and Undue Diligence, 149 J.
Econ. Theory 128, 128 (2014); Daniel G. Goldstein, Undue Diligence?, 20 Bus. Strategy
Rev. 16, 16 (2009) (“[C]ollecting and analysing all available data may turn out to be un‐
due diligence.”) (emphasis in original); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of
Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 Amer. Econ. Rev. 561, 573 (1971)
(showing that “[p]rivate information that remains private . . . [has] no social value—in
the sense of being purely redistributive, not leading to any improvement in productive
arrangements” and “[t]here is an incentive for individuals to expend resources in a so‐
cially wasteful way in the generation of such information”).
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socially suboptimal for information‐related reasons, as information‐
thin market structures are more fragile and encouraging infor‐
mation production may produce positive externalities. Nonetheless,
virtually all markets can tolerate some information gaps, and some
may require such gaps.152
The third building block is that the effect of new information on
market functioning and the processes through which markets in‐
corporate new information depend on market structure. This sup‐
position is illustrated by returning to the differences between equity
and money markets. These markets typically achieve the relative
parity in information required for trade in quite different ways. Eq‐
uity markets “level up” the informational playing field through pub‐
licly observable prices that contain meaningful information about
the value of the underlying assets. This works because the same
processes that reward sophisticated investors for engaging in costly
information gathering and analysis simultaneously push prices to
relatively more efficient levels. At the same time, public and private
institutions that enhance the efficiency of these markets promote
market functioning, as the more accurate an otherwise uninformed
investor perceives prices to be, the more rational it will be for him
to acquire an equity claim without engaging in costly diligence.
Money markets, by contrast, often “level down” through claim
structures that make it costly and unrewarding for claimants to ac‐
quire superior information about the underlying assets. Such ar‐
rangements are both necessitated and facilitated by the payoff
structure of money claims; as is the case with all debt instruments,
money claimants receive no additional return if the value of the as‐
sets backing their claim exceed the par value of that claim.153 This
means, for example, that the holder of a money claim with a par val‐
ue of $10,000 who has access to a reliable proxy indicating that the
value of the assets backing that claim is between $20,000 and
$30,000 has no reason to gather the information required to more
precisely value those assets. The lack of any upside removes any in‐
152 Even equity markets, where information gaps tend to be quite small and short‐
lived, depend on those modest gaps to incentivize the information gathering and analy‐
sis required to help them remain informationally efficient. This insight from Gilson and
Kraakman enabled them to explain why Professor Sanford Grossman’s efficiency para‐
dox is not a paradox in practice. Gilson & Kraakman, MOME, supra note 24, at 623.
153 See Holmstrom, supra note 9, at 3–4.
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centive to engage in due diligence so long as a claimant has reason
to believe the value of the underlying assets comfortably exceeds
the value of her claim. These are among the reasons that money
claimants rely on proxies suggesting that a claim is exceptionally
low risk coupled with a right to exit, quickly and at face value, as a
substitute for high‐quality information.
This lays the foundation for another important difference be‐
tween money and equity markets—how they respond to new in‐
formation. Equity prices typically respond to new information in an
incremental fashion, going up or down proportionately as new in‐
formation enters.154 Money markets operate quite differently. In in‐
formation‐thin money markets, new information will either have no
observable impact or trigger dysfunction. Put differently, infor‐
mation that accords with the assumptions that underlie a money
claimant’s willingness to rely on a particular proxy as strongly in‐
dicative that her claim is exceptionally low risk should have little
impact on pricing or market functioning. By contrast, information
that suggests that her claim is higher risk than she previously be‐
lieved or that casts doubt on the accuracy of a proxy on which she
had been relying might well cause her to walk away. This leads to
significant nonlinearities in how money markets respond to new in‐
formation, in stark contrast to equity markets. This also leads to the
fourth and final building block—the effect of information and infor‐
mation gaps on market functioning can be state contingent.
C. Information Gaps and Systemic Stability
Building on these four understandings, this Article argues that in‐
formation gaps accentuate the fragility that arises whenever an in‐
stitution relies on money claims as a significant source of funding.
154 Bubbles represent an important exception to this general rule. Yet, bubbles are
the exception rather than the norm and, as reflected recently by the popping of the dot‐
com bubble, even large stock market bubbles can burst without necessarily inflicting
the type of adverse effects on the real economy that follow dysfunction in money mar‐
kets. E.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chair, Fed. Reserve Sys., Some Reflections on the Crisis and
the Policy Response, Address at the Russell Sage Foundation and The Century Founda‐
tion Conference on Rethinking Finance (Apr. 13, 2012) (“[A]ny theory of the crisis that
ties its magnitude to the size of the housing bust must also explain why the fall of dot‐
com stock prices just a few years earlier, which destroyed as much or more paper
wealth—more than $8 trillion—resulted in a relatively short and mild recession and no
major financial instability.”).
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Information gaps make panics more likely and they exacerbate the
degree of market dysfunction that results when confidence gives
way to panic. This Section explains why the range of signals that
might trigger a change of state are expanded and the process of re‐
storing confidence should panic take hold is hampered when infor‐
mation gaps are large. Part IV establishes that the conjectures made
here are consistent with quantitative and qualitative information
about how events unfolded during the Crisis. The different issues
discussed here all arise from the common challenge posed by infor‐
mation gaps—it is costly to produce information and, when those
costs are high because the gaps are large, this can result in signifi‐
cant frictions limiting the capacity of market participants and regu‐
lators to respond in a timely and appropriate way to new develop‐
ments.
The analysis that follows focuses first on whether money claim‐
ants are likely to run and then on the ways that other market partic‐
ipants and regulators will respond if and when money claimants
withdraw, but this breakdown is used merely for purposes of expo‐
sition. Each set of developments is closely intertwined with and to
some extent contingent upon the others. If money claimants expect
government backstops, for example, this could halt a run before it
begins. Similarly, if loss‐absorbing capital could instantly come in to
fill the shortfalls created when money claimants exit, this would ob‐
viate the need for fire sales and the market dysfunction that arises
when money claimants run. Thus, this Article’s claims about the
probability of a panic and the scope and duration of the market dys‐
function that arises as a result are really just variations on a com‐
mon claim—the frictions imposed on the capacity of an intermedia‐
tion regime to acclimate to certain types of information can
significantly exacerbate the market dysfunction that results from
such a trigger.
1. Tendency to Run
Recognizing that money claimants almost always have radically
incomplete information about the assets underlying their claims is
critical to understanding when they are likely to exercise their right
to exit, and thus when we are likely to see destabilizing runs.
Switching and other costs create a small friction on money claim‐
ants’ disposition to make withdrawals in situations where they con‐
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tinue to prefer holding some type of money claim to cash. Nonethe‐
less, money claimants are holding money claims because they are
seeking an instrument that is so low risk they do not need to engage
in any meaningful due diligence. Thus, even a modest amount of
credit risk or an inability to be confident that the credit risk is low
could trigger withdrawals.
Economists often explain runs using one or both of two para‐
digms.155 One view, espoused most famously by Diamond and Dyb‐
vig, posits that runs arise from coordination problems among mon‐
ey claimants.156 Because this view depicts runs as self‐fulfilling
prophecies which can occur independent of any substantive change
in the underlying assets or money claimants’ beliefs about the same,
it is often labeled the “sunspot” theory of runs.157 A number of sub‐
sequent studies provide rich accounts of the mechanisms that might
underlie such runs, but they tend to share the common challenge of
having little predictive power and no inherent stopping point.158 An
alternative view posits that banking panics are extensions of the
business cycle.159 In this view, panics are “caused by depositor revi‐
sions in the perceived risk of bank debt,” typically triggered by a
signal of a pending economic downturn.160 Many contributions that
depict runs as arising from fundamentals suggest that information
asymmetries between banks and money claimants are critical to ex‐
155 See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Ana Babus & Elena Carletti, Financial Crises: Theory and
Evidence, 1 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 97, 99–102 (2009) (explaining that the literature gen‐
erally falls into two camps—one of which “maintains that panics are undesirable events
caused by random deposit withdrawals unrelated to changes in the real economy” and
a “second set of theories of banking crises [suggesting] that they are a natural out‐
growth of the business cycle”—and identifying the main contributions to both).
156 Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 48, at 402.
157 Franklin Allen et al., Introduction to Financial Economics 149 J. Econ. Theory 1, 2
(2014).
158 E.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1 Handbook of
the Economics of Finance, 431, 508 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M.
Stulz eds., 2003) (explaining that “a major difficulty is that Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
is not a testable theory, since any observed a phenomenon is consistent with ‘sun‐
spots’”).
159 E.g., Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models,
Facts, and Bank Regulation, in Financial Markets and Financial Crises 107 (R. Glenn
Hubbard ed., 1991) (identifying this view as running through a number of models and
showing that it is consistent with historical evidence from the period between the
adoption of the National Bank Act and the founding of the Federal Reserve); Franklin
Allen & Douglas Gale, Optimal Financial Crises, 53 J. Fin. 1245, 1245 (1998).
160 Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 159, at 111.
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plaining runs on solvent institutions.161 While some models lie be‐
tween these two paradigms,162 the sunspot and business cycle theo‐
ries remain the two most influential paradigms for bank runs. This
is reflected in the fact that empirical studies of runs by money
claimants continue to attribute withdrawals that can be explained
by changes in credit risk or other fundamentals to the latter model
while attributing run‐like behavior that cannot be so justified as ev‐
idence of sunspots.163
Recognizing information gaps suggests another mechanism that
could cause runs to exceed the scope justified by the increased cred‐
it risk while nonetheless being driven by information, or rather lack
thereof. As a starting point, subject to modest frictions, it is rational
for a money claimant to withdraw when new evidence (1) reveals
that a claim has appreciable credit risk, and thus is information sen‐
sitive; or (2) renders it unclear whether a claim is sufficiently low
risk to justify information‐insensitive treatment. Because infor‐
mation gaps make it more difficult for a money claimant to assess
whether a signal bears on the value of the specific assets underlying
its claim, information gaps increase the types of information that fall
into category two. As a result, the larger the information gaps that
exist, the greater the range of signals that could trigger a run. To
make this more concrete, the types of signals that might trigger a
run need not be limited to ones that indicate banks generally will
underperform, such as a looming recession.164 Rather, any signal
that suggests some subset of the assets backing some money claims
are riskier than previously believed, and which belies the reliability
of a proxy on which money claimants had relied to conclude their
claims were so low risk as to merit information‐insensitive treat‐
ment, could trigger widespread withdrawals.
161 E.g., Allen, Babus & Carletti, supra note 155, at 100 (describing the theories that
rely on information asymmetries).
162 Allen et al., supra note 157, at 2–3 (providing an overview of the two main theo‐
ries and the recent literature suggesting an intermediate interpretation); Gorton &
Winton, supra note 158, at 507–08 (summarizing the alternative theories). In part be‐
cause the information‐based set of theories has tended to be more elastic in what it can
reach, one could characterize the intermediate models as instead extensions of the in‐
formation‐based set of theories.
163 See infra Section IV.A.
164 Id. See also Gorton & Winton, supra note 158, at 505 (identifying the fact that “a
recession is looming” as the paradigmatic signal triggering panic in the information‐
based theories of bank runs).
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In contrast to many of the other information‐based theories of
bank runs, the mechanism proposed here does not require infor‐
mation asymmetries and can occur even when money claimants do
not anticipate adverse selection.165 Money claimants run because
they are unable—without undertaking due diligence in excess of the
amount that is cost justified—to assure themselves that a claim they
are holding is sufficiently low risk to justify ongoing treatment as if
it is information insensitive. This means that the presumption of
mutual ignorance could hold even during a period of widespread
withdrawals.166 While not ruling out the possibility of sunspots, this
frame provides a way to understand runs not readily explained by
credit risk as nonetheless being driven by information, or rather,
lack thereof.
2. Shock Absorbers
The fragility arising from information gaps is exacerbated by the
ways information gaps impede the market and regulatory processes
that can prevent an adverse signal from triggering a widespread
panic and that can help restore stability once panic takes hold. One
way for the government to prevent and contain runs is to guarantee
money claims.167 Such a policy can be instituted ex ante, as in the

165 In many ways, this view updates the approach taken by Professors Charles Calo‐
miris and Gary Gorton, supra note 159, in identifying a link among the information‐
based theories by building on their insight that institutions matter and can affect how
vulnerable a particular regime will be to a run while extending their intuitions to an
environment in which shadow banks rather than banks issue money claims, and the
information challenge is one of common ignorance rather than information asymme‐
tries.
166 This is one of the core ways this Article differs from related work by Professors
Samuel Hanson and Adi Sunderam, arguing that insufficient information production
may have contributed to the Crisis. In their model, there are some fully informed
agents; just too few of them. This distinction creates a state where concern about ad‐
verse selection drives would‐be buyers from the market. Samuel G. Hanson & Adi Sun‐
deram, Are There Too Many Safe Securities? Securitization and the Incentives for In‐
formation Production, 108 J. Fin. Econ. 565, 567 (2013). The analysis here, by contrast,
suggests that at least some of the market dysfunction was due not to concerns about
adverse selection by the party on the other side of a trade but by simple lack of infor‐
mation revealed to be relevant.
167 E.g., Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic
of 2007, at 2 (2009) (prepared for the Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2009 Fin. Mkt.
Conference Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 3, at 262 (“[W]ith the advent of de‐
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case of FDIC insurance, or ex post, as occurred when the Treasury
Department backstopped money market mutual funds to stem
withdrawals after the failure of Lehman Brothers caused one fund to
break the buck.168 By rendering both risks and unknown unknowns
irrelevant to the expected return on a money claim, insurance and
implicit guarantees significantly reduce money claimants’ tendency
to run.169 So long as the insurer is creditworthy and committed, no
other information matters and the claim becomes effectively infor‐
mation insensitive.
While exceptionally potent, insurance regimes also entail real
costs. One challenge is the moral hazard that inevitably results.170
Another is that when the government provides insurance, it exposes
itself to credit risk. The banking system has never fully resolved the‐
se challenges, but the extensive supervisory and regulatory regime
governing banks goes a long way toward reducing them.171 Guaran‐
tees can play similarly helpful roles promoting stability outside the
regulated banking sector, but the associated moral hazard and cred‐
it risk increase dramatically in the absence of a comparable ex ante
regulatory scheme.
A second way that regulators can promote market functioning
when market participants become concerned about information
that they lack is to help fill the gaps. As Federal Reserve Governor
Daniel Tarullo has explained, once a crisis takes hold, “the only way
posit insurance in 1933, the United States entered an unprecedented Quiet Period of
seventy‐plus years with no panics and no serious economic disasters.”).
168 See generally Judge, The Importance of “Money,” supra note 51 (reviewing a book
that proposes a broad ex ante regime and describing the benefits of instead having a
more modest ex ante guarantee coupled with the possibility of ex post expansion). See
also Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk, supra note 9, at 149; Macey & O’Hara, supra note
86, at 97–98.
169 Carnell et al., supra note 70, at 271–72 (describing how deposit insurance solves
the collective action problem that can cause even healthy banks to fail).
170 E.g., Macey & O’Hara, supra note 86, at 97 (“Despite the positive effect of FDIC in‐
surance on preventing bank runs, the implementation of deposit insurance poses a
regulatory cost of its own—it gives the shareholders and managers of insured banks
incentives to engage in excessive risk‐taking.”); Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Crea‐
tion after the Crisis, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 75, 119 (2011) (noting “[u]nless the govern‐
ment can price deposit insurance premiums perfectly and update them continuously,
depository owners and management can extract value from the government’s insur‐
ance policy by taking greater risks[,]” but “[m]oral hazard is a feature of all insurance
markets”).
171 See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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that market actors are going to start regaining any confidence is if
they think they understand what is going on.”172 Injecting credible
information into the system can help quell a panic by convincing
some money claimants that their claims are still sufficiently low risk
to merit treatment as money.173 Information injections can also play
a critical role in reducing the frictions inhibiting the entry of in‐
formed, loss‐bearing capital by reducing the information generation
such capital holders must undertake to assess whether a claim is
appropriately priced. Again, this is a technique long employed by
bank examiners, alongside their tendencies toward confidentiality.
It was even used by private actors seeking to restore stability before
banks were as thoroughly regulated.174 Nonetheless, it is not a viable
policy tool when the government lacks credible information.
A third tool frequently employed to mitigate financial crises is for
a central bank to provide fresh liquidity to the banks or other enti‐
ties facing liquidity constraints, reducing the need for the value‐
destroying fire sales which can otherwise be a powerful mechanism
of contagion. The standard way central banks provide fresh liquidity
is through collateralized loans, which enable a bank or other entity
to post less‐liquid collateral in exchange for cash equivalents or oth‐
er liquid assets.175 Without high‐quality information about the actual
value of the assets pledged as collateral, however, or the soundness
of the firms pledging that collateral, the line between liquidity sup‐
port and credit support quickly blurs, and interventions designed to

172 Donna Borak, The Increasing Leverage of Daniel Tarullo, Am. Banker (July 28,
2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/magazine/123_8/the‐increasing‐leverage‐of‐
daniel‐tarullo‐1060538‐1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1 (quoting Tarullo).
173 Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 159, at 160–62.
174 For example, in engineering the end of the panic of 1907, J.P. Morgan provided li‐
quidity only to those trusts he had determined were solvent, so when he did provide
support, he not only supplied the troubled institution with much needed liquidity, but
he also effectively signaled to the public that certain trusts could be trusted. Robert F.
Bruner & Sean D. Carr, The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned From the Market’s Perfect
Storm 87–95 (2007). See also Alan Morrison & Lucy White, Reputational Contagion and
Optimal Regulatory Forbearance, 110 J. Fin. Econ. 642 (2013) (formally demonstrating
how reliance on regulators can function as a mechanism of contagion).
175 Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116
Colum. L. Rev. 843, 856 (2016) [hereinafter Judge, The First Year] (describing the Fed‐
eral Reserve’s expanded use of new liquidity facilities in 2008, such as “to help revive
the securitization market . . . a facility that allowed users to borrow funds on a nonre‐
course basis as long as they provided the requisite collateral”).
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help restore stability can instead exacerbate the fragility, delay nec‐
essary transfers, and engender excessive moral hazard.176
This leads to a fourth strategy for helping to restore stability,
which is to recapitalize the entities issuing the money claims. Con‐
cerns about the value of underlying assets often indicate a need for
more capital that is able to bear risk. Again, this is a strategy long
used to restore stability when banking crises hit. Yet, information
gaps again make this strategy more difficult to deploy: the less in‐
formation policymakers have about asset values, associated risks,
and the distribution of risks across a financial system, the less able
they are to tailor capital injections to the scale and scope of the
problems they are facing. This can lead to delays, increasing the size
and scope of a financial crisis. It can also result in the provision of
excess capital, increasing moral hazard and the credit risk to which
the government is exposed.
Yet to understand why information gaps pose such a challenge
during periods of systemic distress, it is important to bear in mind
that market participants also lack the pertinent information. This is
key because the optimal role for regulators is often to work with, ra‐
ther than supplant, private actors. When new capital is needed, capi‐
tal should ideally come from private sources and the influx of loss‐
absorbing capital should result in the production of some of the
missing information. Market participants will not enter, however,
unless the expected returns exceed the sum of the expected cost of
the assets and the cost of undertaking the information gathering and
analysis required to make wise acquisition decisions. Sizeable
knowable but unknown unknowns thus create large hurdles, reduc‐
ing the likelihood that private capital will enter in a timely fashion
or the holders will be willing to sell at the prices such buyers might
be willing to offer.177
Critically, just as with the explanation provided here for bank
runs, understanding these frictions highlights the importance of

176 Id. at 874–75 (noting backstopping by “increasingly creative” regulators “stabi‐
lized markets, but it did so primarily by allowing market participants to rely on the
creditworthiness of the government in lieu of frank assessments of counterparty risk
and asset values”); Clamoris & Gorton, supra note 159, at 160–62.
177 Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs, supra note 25, at 319 (“Information of
great relevance to pricing some of the instruments associated with the Subprime Crisis
was very costly—too costly, in fact, to enter into the pricing of these instruments.”).
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recognizing information gaps and distinguishing them from the
more commonly recognized frictions typically associated with in‐
formation asymmetries and concerns about adverse selection. The
analysis here reveals new dynamics that operate alongside known
frictions, ones that are critical for developing a robust understand‐
ing of the ways that complexity and incomplete information affect
fragility.
IV. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION GAPS IN THE CRISIS
Having established theoretically why information gaps are likely
to flourish in the shadow banking system and contribute to its fragil‐
ity, the question becomes whether the evidence supports this Arti‐
cle’s conjectures. This Part uses the Crisis to explore these issues.178
A. Escalation
It is widely, though not universally, recognized that the Crisis
started in August 2007.179 The information that eventually triggered
the market dysfunction that erupted that August had been building
for some time. The housing market started to weaken in late 2006,
adversely affecting the demand for mortgage‐backed securities
(“MBS”), particularly those backed by subprime loans, which were
revealed to be riskier than previously believed. By the end of July
2007, the lead credit‐rating agencies had engaged in record down‐
grades, downgrading well over a thousand subprime MBS.180 The
ABX index for lower‐rated, subprime MBS, an important mechanism
aggregating views on the value of subprime MBS, was also declining
throughout 2007.181 Nonetheless, it was not until August 9, when
BNP Paribas announced it was temporarily suspending redemptions

178 For a more detailed analysis of the ways these dynamics shaped the first year of
the Crisis, see Judge, The First Year, supra note 175.
179 Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity, 68 J. Fin
2549 (2013) and sources cited therein.
180 Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Col‐
lapse 264 (2011), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report‐psi‐staff‐report‐
wall‐street‐and‐the‐financial‐crisis‐anatomy‐of‐afinancial‐collapse
[https://perma.cc/Q42W‐G748].
181 Gorton, supra note 167, at 5; Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking
and the Run on Repo, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 425, 434–36 (2012).
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in three funds because of a lack of liquidity in the subprime MBS
market, that the bad news that had been building all summer led to
widespread market dysfunction.182 The lack of symmetry between
the way that the information gradually built up over time and the
dramatic, nonlinear shift in the way that information affected mar‐
ket functioning is consistent with the description of how money
claimants—as opposed to equity claimants—respond to new infor‐
mation.183
Empirical evidence supports that there was a “run” on asset‐
backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) starting in August 2007. Profes‐
sor Daniel Covitz and coauthors use data on all ABCP issued in the
United States in 2007 to show that the market was remarkably sta‐
ble for the first half of the year despite the accumulating bad news,
but it then disintegrated quickly.184 Covitz and his coauthors found
that prior to August, “[r]uns . . . were quite low . . . . Starting in Au‐
gust, the percent of ABCP programs experiencing a run each week
climbed sharply.”185 By September, more than “30 percent of all
ABCP programs” had experienced a run and “by the end of 2007,
more than 40 percent of programs were in a run.”186 As a result,
even though “only 3% of paper defaulted by the end of 2007,… ABCP
outstanding dropped by about 35%.”187 This means that despite a
low default rate, the “ABCP market contracted about $350 billion in
the last 5 months 2007,” marking a very sizeable reduction in a very
short period of time.188
On the one hand, the number of programs experiencing a run far
exceeded the number of programs that actually ended up defaulting,
indicating that holders of ABCP ran on a number of programs that
were fundamentally sound or otherwise protected. Moreover, there
is no single variable or combination of variables that predicts which
programs would experience a run, and investors had very little in‐
See Judge, The First Year, supra note 175, at 874.
See supra Part I.
184 Daniel Covitz, et al., supra note 114, at 816–17, 816 fig.1, 829 fig.2, 831 fig.3.
185 Covitz, supra note 114, at 828. They define a “run” as occurring when an ABCP
program does not issue any new ABCP despite having at least 10% of its outstanding
ABCP mature in that week or having experienced a run in a previous week and still not
issuing new ABCP. Id. at 827.
186 Id. at 828.
187 Id. at 845.
188 Id.
182
183
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formation about the specific assets underlying the ABCP they
held.189 These findings suggest that not all of the runs can be at‐
tributed to fundamentals. On the other hand, the proportion of ABCP
programs that experienced a run was well shy of 100% and the runs
that did occur “were not random”—as one might expect if the runs
were solely the byproduct of coordination challenges.190 Rather, as
Covitz and his co‐authors explain, “the results from the panel re‐
gressions of runs suggest that, “runs were more likely at programs
with weaker support, greater exposure to subprime mortgages, and
weaker sponsors.”191 These findings are, at the least, consistent with
what this Article’s claim would predict: holders of ABCP ran when
the fundamentals so justified or when they lacked sufficient infor‐
mation about a program’s exposure to problematic assets to be con‐
fident with regard to the safety and liquidity of their holdings. That
the runs occurred following a signal that suggested problems with
respect to only a small subset of the assets backing ABCP is also con‐
sistent with this Article’s suggestion that information gaps can in‐
crease fragility by expanding the range of signals that can trigger a
run.
Holders of other money claims that had supported the shadow
banking system engaged in similar run‐like behavior. Gary Gorton
and Andrew Metrick, for example, document a run on repo—
another money claim issued in the shadow banking system—that
also started in August 2007 and became more pronounced following
the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.192 Their focus is
on “haircuts,” the degree of overcollateralization that holders de‐
manded to treat a claim like money. As Gorton and Metrick explain,
rising haircuts function like withdrawals because they reduce the
amount of funding that a firm can obtain using particular collateral.
Again, the evidence shows significant nonlinearities in how money
claimants responded to new information depending on the type of
189 Id. at 820 (explaining that “[i]nvestors appeared to have little understanding of
the credit quality of ABCP portfolios leading up to the turmoil in August 2007” and
providing further evidence to support the notion that investors lacked meaningful in‐
formation about the specific assets underlying the ABCP they held).
190 Covitz, Panic, supra note 184, at 839. See also id. at 832‐35 (using cross‐sectional
regressions and producing similar findings).
191 Covitz, Panic, supra note 184, at 839. See also id. at 832‐35 (using cross‐sectional
regressions and producing similar findings).
192 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 181, at 448.
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collateral that backed a money claim. The degree of overcollaterali‐
zation money claimants demanded increased in accord with rising
“uncertainty about collateral values,”193 and it became virtually im‐
possible for parties seeking to issue money claims to use the most
opaque and difficult‐to‐value assets as collateral.194 Given that more
complex assets are likely to be only incompletely understood by ei‐
ther party to a repo transaction, that haircuts increased most dra‐
matically for such assets is yet another finding that is more con‐
sistent with the notion that information gaps drove some subset of
the run behavior than theories that depend on information asymme‐
tries to explain runs.
The escalation of the Crisis entailed similar dynamics. For exam‐
ple, among the factors contributing to the magnitude of the adverse
ripple effects of the Lehman Brothers failure was the impact of that
bankruptcy on money market mutual funds. The day after Lehman’s
bankruptcy, one money market mutual fund holding commercial
paper issued by Lehman Brothers “broke the buck,” causing it to re‐
deem shares, at the lowest point, at $0.97 per share, before going
through an orderly resolution that provided holders $0.99 for each
share that under ideal circumstances would be worth $1.00.195 De‐
spite the relative modesty of these losses, many money market mu‐
tual fund holders reacted by quickly exercising their right to exit.
Again, subsequent empirical analysis confirms “run‐like behavior,”
and that this behavior varied across fund types.196 Institutional in‐
vestors were more likely to exit and exited more quickly than retail
investors; and, although institutional investors withdrew massive
amounts of capital from funds holding nongovernment assets, they
simultaneously acquired shares in money market mutual funds
holding “U.S. Government‐backed securities.”197
In all of these instances, money claimants had been providing cap‐
ital consistently despite having limited information about the assets
underlying their claims and the risks to which those assets were ex‐
Id. at 444.
Id. at 440 (“The market disappeared or unpriced CDOs and CLOs, unpriced ABS
and MBS, all subprime; and AA‐AAA CDO.”).
195 See Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk, supra note 9, at 145–46.
196 Lawrence D. W. Schmidt et. al., Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds 1 (Sept. 11,
2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784445
[https://perma.cc/D4TE‐R976].
197 Id. at 2 fig.1.
193
194
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posed. The withdrawals thus were not triggered by the fact that
holders lacked material information; the information gaps predated
the runs. Moreover, in most of these instances, there was a notable
asymmetry between the incremental buildup of bad news and the
way money claimants reacted to that information. The claims were
structured to be information insensitive, and so money claimants
did not respond in any in meaningful way to the first (and second
and third. . .) signs of bad news. Nonetheless, when bad news was
coupled with information suggesting that the proxies money claim‐
ants had relied on were less accurate than previously believed,
money claimants exited quickly. And, when they did, they did not
withdraw from everything, nor did they withdraw only when doing
so was justified by increased credit risk. Rather, the withdrawals fol‐
lowed an intermediate course precisely as the analysis here pre‐
dicts.
The data examined here represent only a subset of the work that
has been done on the Crisis and other periods of systemic distress,
but they also represent some of the more important empirical work
on the fragility of the shadow banking system. It is thus notable,
even if far from conclusive, that this evidence comports with this Ar‐
ticle’s claims.
B. Restoring Stability
The Crisis also illustrates how information gaps impede the pub‐
lic and private processes that can restore stability when money
claimants run. As an initial matter, all of the runs on the shadow
banking system occurred in part because there was no insurance
scheme or established liquidity facility in place deterring money
claimants from running. Similarly, policymakers were not in a posi‐
tion to assure money claimants regarding the value of the assets un‐
derlying their claims or to help money claimants discern which
claims were most likely to be exposed to problematic assets because
the government did not have any superior information about such
matters. Additionally, while the government eventually did recapi‐
talize important components of the financial system, it did not in‐
tervene to provide capital support until well over a year into the
Crisis, and the scope of the Crisis grew significantly during the inter‐
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im. The lack of information leading policymakers possessed appears
to have contributed to that delay.198 Moreover, the Crisis was esca‐
lating throughout 2007 and much of 2008 in part because informed
capital was not coming in to counteract the vacuum created as mon‐
ey claimants fled from an ever‐expanding array of markets. Concur‐
rent assessments of the market dysfunction suggest information
gaps were a significant contributing factor.199
Policymakers ultimately utilized all of the tools long used to ad‐
dress banking crises—guarantees, liquidity support, information in‐
jections, and fresh capital. They did so in significant part because
they recognized that failure to do so would have resulted in even
greater market dysfunction and more adverse spillover effects on
the real economy. The Federal Reserve’s many temporary liquidity
facilities, its support of Bear Stearns and AIG, the Treasury’s provi‐
sion of explicit insurance policies for money market mutual funds
and the credit and other support that the Treasury provided to
banks through the Troubled Asset Relief Program were all mecha‐
nisms of assuring short‐term and other creditors. Yet—in stark con‐
trast to the banking regime—there was no ex ante system of con‐
trolling the activities in which these entities engaged and the assets
they could hold, nor was there a supervisory regime providing regu‐
lators high‐quality information about the risks of the underlying as‐
sets.
As reflected in the Dodd‐Frank Act and other post‐Crisis reforms,
the expansion of the government safety net to nonbank firms is
widely perceived as having created significant moral hazard, requir‐
ing the adoption of extensive and quite costly regulatory reforms.200
Less commented on but no less important is how the dearth of in‐
formation that the government possessed when it extended liquidity
and credit guarantees increased the effective credit risk that the
government assumed. The government, for example, ultimately
profited from the interests in AIG it obtained in connection with
198 See generally Judge, The First Year, supra note 175 (recounting the Crisis through
the lens of information problems).
199 Id.
200 See Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Fed. Reserve Sys., Finance and Society (May 6, 2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150506a.htm
[https://perma.cc/2LCW‐UP8E] (“In the aftermath of the crisis, the Congress tasked
the banking regulators with challenging and changing the perception that any financial
institution is too big to fail . . . .”).
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helping the firm avert bankruptcy, but that by no means alters the
accuracy of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s statement that
he “thought we were taking enormous, unprecedented risks and
that there was substantial risk that we would lose billions of dollars,
if not tens of billions of dollars” when it first took that action.201
Policymakers also directly targeted the information gaps that
were inhibiting market functioning. The most clear‐cut example of
policymakers using information injections to promote market func‐
tioning was the public disclosure of the results of stress tests con‐
ducted on the largest banking holding companies.202 As then‐Federal
Reserve Chairman Bernanke later explained, the Federal Reserve
recognized that “[t]he loss of confidence we have seen in some
banking institutions has arisen not only because market participants
expect the future loss rates on many banking assets to be high, but
because they also perceive the range of uncertainty surrounding es‐
timated loss rates as being unusually wide” and the stress tests were
“designed to reduce this uncertainty.”203 In opting to publicly dis‐
close the results of the tests, Federal Reserve policymakers rea‐
soned that, given that uncertainty remained pervasive and was itself
adversely affecting market functioning, “[e]ven a mixed bag of in‐
formation about the actual condition of banks” would enhance mar‐
ket functioning.204 The market’s response to the stress tests sup‐
ported the conjecture.205 As Bernanke later opined, the stress tests
201 James B. Stewart, Solvency, Lost in the Fog at the Fed, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/business/the‐feds‐ambiguous‐definition‐of‐
solvency.html?_r=0.
202 E.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chair, Fed. Reserve Sys., The Supervisory Capital Assess‐
ment
Program
(May
11,
2009),
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090511a.htm
[https://perma.cc/HQ4X‐AHFN]. The willingness of Federal Reserve officials to under‐
take tests that were sufficiently robust to be credible, and to commit to disclosing the
results, also rested upon the fact that Congress had authorized the Treasury to provide
significant capital support to the banking system. As such, it was clear that the govern‐
ment could and would use taxpayer funds to recapitalize any banking organizations
revealed to be deficient. See also Donald P. Morgan et. al., The Information Value of the
Stress Test, 46 J. Money, Credit & Banking 1479, 1482 (2014) (explaining how in the
2009 stress test, “[b]anks with [capital] gaps were required to file capital plans describ‐
ing how they intended to fill the gap (whether privately, via conversions, or via [Capital
Assistance Plan]) by November 2009”).
203 Bernanke, supra note 202.
204 Borak, supra note 172 (describing Tarullo’s rationale for pushing for disclosure).
205 See, e.g., Morgan, Peristiani & Savino, supra note 202, at 1498–99.
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were “critical turning points in the financial crisis,” because they
“provided anxious investors with something they craved: credible
information about prospective losses at banks.”206 The stress tests
are a good example of effective crisis management. Nonetheless,
that they occurred only after the Crisis had been underway for a
prolonged period of time and after the government had significantly
expanded its safety net illustrates the mismatch between the regula‐
tory structures in place and regulators’ capacity to address the chal‐
lenges they faced. While far from exhaustive, this subsection and re‐
lated work highlight the ways that information gaps arising from the
many things no one knew about the shadow banking system affected
the capacity of regulators to deter money claimants from running,
the drawbacks of the government interventions eventually imple‐
mented, and the degree to which they could enlist the help of other
market participants in their efforts to restore stability.
C. Qualitative Support and the Importance of Terminology
How policymakers talked about the challenges they were facing
during the Crisis provides further support for the importance of de‐
lineating information gaps as a distinct dynamic and for the role
they played during the Crisis. Even during the early phases of the
Crisis, Federal Reserve Governor Frederic Mishkin and others rec‐
ognized that “[t]he issue is that there’s an information problem in
the markets.”207 Federal Reserve officials also recognized that the
rise of the shadow banking system limited the amount of infor‐
mation they had about those challenges. As Governor Randall
Kroszner observed, “In the old days, we used to know where the
risks were; unfortunately, we knew that they were all on the bank
balance sheets. With the originate‐to‐distribute model and securiti‐
zation[—core components of the shadow banking system—] . . . the
risks are much more dispersed.”208 He further noted that this “leads
206 Ben S. Bernanke, Chair, Fed. Reserve Sys., Stress Testing Banks: What Have We
Learned?
(Apr.
8,
2013),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20130408a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VEW3‐KEU2].
207 Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Conference Call on Aug. 16, 2007, at 30
(statement of Frederic Mishkin).
208 Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Sept. 18, 2007, at 86 (state‐
ment of Randall Kroszner).
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to potential pockets of uncertainty, and that is exactly what has
come up.”209
Policymakers were even attuned to many of the specific mecha‐
nisms through which the information problems were causing the
market dysfunction to spread. As Governor Donald Kohn explained:
“A critical channel of contagion . . . was the involvement of banks as
providers of credit and liquidity backstops in the ABCP market”
which caused “uncertainties about real estate markets, the perfor‐
mance of nonprime mortgages, and structured‐credit products [to
come] to rest as greater uncertainty about bank exposures.”210 Other
Federal Reserve officials made similar observations.211
Because current theories fail to provide a term that conveys the
challenge as one entailing information that was pertinent and
knowable but not known to anyone, however, Federal Reserve poli‐
cymakers were forced to describe the challenge in established, but
less accurate, terms. For example, Federal Reserve officials often
characterized the problem as a challenge of “uncertainty.” This is
not necessarily wrong, as the challenge was a problem of unknown
unknowns. Yet, by failing to distinguish between Knightian uncer‐
tainty, which is exogenously determined and outside the power of
anyone to control, and information gaps, this framing may have lim‐
ited policymakers’ appreciation of the types of tools that could be
brought to bear.
Reflecting the fact that some policymakers recognized that the
missing information was knowable and thus not traditional Knighti‐
an uncertainty, they at times instead invoked the notion of asymme‐
tries to describe the challenges they were facing. For example, in as‐
sessing the market dysfunction that surrounded MBS, Bernanke
explained:
[W]e have seen the breakdown of a particular structure of lending
that was based on the credit ratings. The credit ratings have prov‐
en to be false. Therefore, there is an informational deficit—an

Id.
Id. at 74–75 (statement of Donald Kohn).
211 See Judge, The First Year, supra note 175, at 879–81 (citing statements from the
August 16, 2007, Federal Open Market Committee conference call and the September
18, 2007, Federal Open Market Committee meeting).
209
210
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asymmetric information problem, would be my interpretation—
which has, in turn, triggered a massive change in preferences.212

Bernanke is certainly correct that there was an “informational defi‐
cit.”213 Nonetheless, in choosing to frame the problem as an asym‐
metry, he is using a characterization that elides the fact that no one
had the relevant information.
Language alone cannot solve difficult problems and there is no
easy solution to the dynamics highlighted here. Nonetheless, that
Federal Reserve officials lacked a term that accurately captured the
information dynamics they saw as contributing to the market dys‐
function during the Crisis certainly did not enhance, and may well
have inhibited, their efforts to respond to those challenges. Expand‐
ing the conceptual framework to recognize information gaps and
acknowledging how they contribute to fragility are thus critical
steps to forging a more productive path toward addressing these is‐
sues.
V. LOOKING AHEAD
Identifying information gaps as among the factors contributing to
the fragility of the shadow banking system raises a number of policy
issues about the optimal level of information production, who
should produce that information, when and how it should be dis‐
closed, and the extent to which information‐related challenges justi‐
fy structural limits on shadow banking and other activities.
There are no easy answers to these questions, just as there is no
easy way to create a system that fulfills the valuable economic func‐
tions currently played by the shadow banking system without sim‐
ultaneously creating systemic risk, but they are critical questions to
address. As reflected in the remarkable stability of the banking sec‐
tor for most of the last century and the variation in the stability of
different banking sectors across different countries, design features
can meaningfully affect fragility.214
212 Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Apr. 29–30, 2008, at 18
(statement of Ben Bernanke).
213 Id.
214 See generally Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Po‐
litical Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit (2014) (exploring how political insti‐
tutions shape outcomes in banking systems); Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 159 (ana‐
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This Part distills some of the key lessons that can be derived from
the analysis here. It begins by highlighting the need for a fundamen‐
tally new financial regulatory paradigm to govern shadow banking.
It then considers the implications of this Article’s insights with re‐
spect to shadow banking reforms underway and further reforms
that may be warranted.
A. A New Regulatory Paradigm
One lesson is that the shadow banking system is a hybrid system,
one that shares much in common with the capital markets and
banks as traditionally constituted, but which cannot be fully under‐
stood within either paradigm. This raises important questions re‐
garding regulatory competencies and the appropriate regulatory
framework. It casts doubt, for example, on whether the SEC, as a se‐
curities regulator, is the best agency to oversee money market mu‐
tual funds, which pose risks of the type normally addressed through
prudential regulation. It also provides fresh support for the im‐
portance of institutions like the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”), which brings together securities regulators and prudential
regulators and asks them to cooperate to identify and address
sources of systemic risk.
The analysis also suggests there might be real gains from deeper
interdisciplinary engagement among academics and other experts.
The different assumptions that various experts implicitly bring to
the table are reflected in their distinct diagnoses of the Crisis and
competing proposals for further reform. While sometimes glossed
over by various framing devices, the differences often run quite
deep.
For example, in recent work, legal academics Gilson and Kraak‐
man expand the insights on the mechanisms of market efficiency to
markets populated by instruments beyond equity claims and do‐
mains where primary markets dominate secondary ones. This leads
them to conclusions that overlap with this Article’s claims—lack of
information and the costs of producing that information played im‐
portant roles contributing to the scope of the Crisis.215 While engag‐
lyzing the institutional factors that historically contribute to the instability of the bank‐
ing system).
215 See Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs, supra note 25, at 351–57.
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ing in an institutional analysis that recognizes that the holders of
many of the instruments issued in the shadow banking system may
be disinclined to undertake any due diligence, they nonetheless
identify more robust mandatory disclosure requirements as an im‐
portant component of the optimal policy response.216 Responding to
that suggestion, economist Holmstrom is dismissive. In his view,
“the logic behind transparency in stock markets does not apply to
money markets.”217 According to Holmstrom, Gilson and Kraakman
have the “wrong diagnosis of [the] problem” and that “to minimise
the chance of new, perhaps worse mistakes, we need to analyse
remedies based on the purpose of liquidity provision.”218
The analysis here suggests that the optimal route forward may lie
between these visions—on a path that incorporates Gilson and
Kraakman’s insights regarding the importance of information and
information costs while also taking into account Holmstrom’s in‐
sights regarding the distinct characteristics of money markets.
Holmstrom’s critique likely underestimates the fragility that arises
from information gaps in financial systems dependent on capital
from money claims and, thus, the potential value in reducing the size
of those gaps in some settings. Yet Holmstrom’s critique has merit. A
core rationale for mandatory disclosure in securities regulations is
that the issuer is the lowest cost producer of such information. In a
world where the issuer of an instrument is a specially created vehi‐
cle holding complex assets, and the holders of the money claims that
the vehicle will issue are relying on the complexity of the underlying
assets to ensure that the issuer and its sponsor have no private in‐
formation about the value of those assets, such an assumption does
not hold.
Gilson and Kraakman have a partial response to this, as the specif‐
ic disclosure regime they propose focuses on tracking the underly‐
ing credit instruments that provide financing to the real economy, so
that those instruments can be more easily traced through the layers
of fragmentation nodes in which those instruments are bundled
with other instruments and new instruments are created.219 Yet, in
See id.
Holmstrom, supra note 9, at 2–3 (citing Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs,
supra note 25).
218 Id. at 3.
219 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 25, at 354.
216
217
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Holmstrom’s analysis, the process of imposing such requirements
could upset the very infrastructure on which such markets currently
rely. Viewed through the lens of the stylized example of Akerlof’s car
market, the spirit of Holmstrom’s critique is that subsidizing the de‐
velopment of technology that would allow buyers in the used car
market to more easily identify lemons risks throwing the baby out
with the bathwater by undermining the viability of the primary
market.
The debate, of course, does not end there—just as a seller of new
cars might use warranties or other mechanisms to overcome the in‐
troduction of new asymmetries, money markets may evolve in ways
that allow money claimants to remain minimally informed despite
regulatory changes that would lower the cost of producing pertinent
information. Moreover, as Gilson and Kraakman highlight, their
proposal is motivated not only by concerns about the markets in
which these various financial claims trade, but also by the origina‐
tion processes that produce the underlying assets. They view great‐
er ongoing scrutiny of origination processes as an important mech‐
anism for ensuring that those practices do not become excessively
lax as a result of the information gaps that would otherwise exist.220
The aim of this hypothetical back and forth is not to resolve this de‐
bate but to highlight the important and quite different insights that
both sides bring to the table.
Taking a step back, the analysis here highlights the value and limi‐
tations of each approach to assessing the challenges posed by shad‐
ow banking. Consistent with Holmstrom, this examination empha‐
sizes the importance of recognizing that the institutional
competencies of equity and money holders arise less from the na‐
ture of the holder and more from the nature of the claim that they
hold. Many large, sophisticated investors hold both equity and mon‐
ey claims but they hold the claims for different reasons: the equity
claims are investments on which they hope to profit; the money
claims are ways to store liquidity. No amount of information or oth‐
er regulatory change is going to transform their approach to money
claims to resemble their approach to equity claims. For this reason,
reform proposals that expect market participants will engage in
meaningful information gathering or that otherwise seek to force
220

See id. at 356.
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money claimants to act like holders of securities that are held for in‐
vestment will fall short if not coupled with other reforms.
At the same time, the analysis here also suggests that fully em‐
bracing the alternative view sometimes advocated by those who
understand banking—that we should accept instability as part of
how the system works, applaud the massive support provided by
the government during the Crisis, and extend the scope of the formal
government safety net—would lead to reforms that are suboptimal
for different reasons. The fact that shadow banking occurs in the
capital markets raises important questions about the mechanisms
for imposing discipline on the processes creating the underlying as‐
sets and the subsequent monitoring required to maintain the value
of those assets, in addition to posing the fragility challenges high‐
lighted here. Many mechanisms that promote stability come at the
expense of robust discipline and the optimal balance is unlikely to
be achieved without a deep understanding of how discipline can and
has been imposed in various settings. In highlighting the differences
between money claims and equity claims and the current regulatory
paradigms governing each, the analysis here provides critical
groundwork for addressing the question of how best to regulate
shadow banking.221
B. Implications for Reform
This Section considers the implications of this Article’s insights on
the post‐Crisis reforms underway, proposals for further reform, and
related policy issues. Because this Article is focused on only a subset
of the challenges posed by shadow banking and makes no effort to
measure the benefits, the aim here is not to chart the optimal path
but to show how this Article’s insights inform these ongoing de‐
bates.

221 This point is not novel, but the analysis adds flesh to the claim. See, e.g., Mehrling
et al., supra note 9, at 1 (advocating “taking a different approach” that resists the “wide‐
spread impulse to frame the question of appropriate oversight and regulation of shad‐
ow banking as a matter of how best to extend the existing system of oversight and
regulation as it is applied to traditional banking”).
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1. Post‐Crisis Reforms
The regulatory reforms already underway make important pro‐
gress with respect to a number of the challenges highlighted here.
For example, the new authority of the FSOC to designate nonbank
financial institutions systemically significant and subject them to
prudential oversight, coupled with the fact that the largest invest‐
ment banks have all converted into or been acquired by bank hold‐
ing companies, significantly expands the scope of the government’s
supervisory authority. This expansion should meaningfully reduce
the magnitude of the information gaps arising from the shadow
banking system. Another important development is the creation of
the Office of Financial Research (“OFR”). The OFR, which supports
the work of the FSOC, has broad authority to not only gather infor‐
mation but to mandate standardization with respect to the ways fi‐
nancial institutions collect and report certain data. Depending on
implementation, the OFR’s work could go a long way toward ad‐
dressing information gaps.222
Despite this real progress, core structural challenges remain.
Money claims issued by nonbanks remain sizeable in amount and
largely outside of the prudential regulatory umbrella,223 efforts to

222 See
Office
of
Fin.
Research,
About
the
OFR,
https://www.financialresearch.gov/about/
(last
visited
Sept.
18,
2015)
[https://perma.cc/8UJL‐BSLH] (stating the mission of OFR is to “[p]romote financial
stability by delivering high‐quality financial data, standards and analysis for the Finan‐
cial Stability Oversight Council and public”).
223 See William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Fixing Wholesale Funding to Build a More Stable Financial System (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud130201.html
[https://perma.cc/PT22‐U3GZ] (urging further reforms of triparty repo system and
money market mutual fund industry but noting that “even after such reforms, we
would still have a system in which a very significant share of financial intermediation
activity vital to the economy takes place in markets and through institutions that have
no direct access to an effective lender of last resort backstop”) (emphasis omitted);
Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Reg‐
ulation
(Nov.
22,
2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm
[https://perma.cc/226C‐TM6C] (“Banks and broker‐dealers currently borrow about
$1.6 trillion, much of this from money market funds and securities lenders . . . .” (citing
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Tri‐party Repo Statistical Data (Oct. 9, 2013),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/banking/pdf/oct13_tpr_stats.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6397‐FWAV])).
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further reform money market mutual funds remain contested,224
and regulations implementing provisions of the Dodd‐Frank Act tar‐
geting other aspects of the shadow banking system seem likely to
fall short.225 Just as importantly, the reforms adopted post‐Crisis
have done relatively little to reduce the complexity of financial in‐
struments and institutions, and that complexity is a significant fac‐
tor exacerbating information gaps. Many of the reforms also remain
focused on institutions rather than markets, and the process of
overseeing the former does not necessarily provide regulators a
deep understanding of the latter, a notable shortcoming for reasons
here revealed.
Recent work by the OFR on short‐term secured lending and repo,
two of the most significant nonbank money markets, illustrates both
the progress made and the magnitude of the information gaps that
remain.226 In summarizing the findings, the head of the OFR stated:
“Data available to regulators and market participants have im‐
proved since the [C]risis but remain insufficient to evaluate the risks
or even the level of activity in these markets.”227 Although the OFR
has a number of projects underway to address these and other in‐
224 Compare, for example, Jonathan R. Macey, Why Investors Shouldn’t Worry About
Money
Funds,
Wall
St.
J.,
(June
3,
2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704904604576335392541845616
(insisting that money funds, when properly managed, are inherently safe and advocat‐
ing for the extension of deposit‐insurance protection to money funds) with Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Why Investors Should Worry About Money Funds, Wall St. J., (June 3, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304520804576343093940388186
(finding the money fund system to be “fragile and susceptible to systemic disruption”
and arguing for a division of the industry into retail and institutional segments, among
other wide‐ranging reforms).
225 E.g., Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mort‐
gage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—from Themselves, 163 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1539, 1544 (2015) (“The [Dodd‐Frank] Act’s approach [to addressing prob‐
lems in the mortgage market] will produce little benefit in terms of improved incen‐
tives and will likely increase, rather than reduce, systemic risk by concentrating mort‐
gage risk in systemically important financial institutions.”).
226 Viktoria Baklanova, Adam Copeland & Rebecca McCaughrin, Reference Guide to
U.S. Repo and Securities Lending Markets 2 (Office of Fin. Research, Working Paper No.
15‐17,
2015),
http://financialresearch.gov/working‐papers/files/OFRwp‐2015‐
17_Reference‐Guide‐to‐U.S.‐Repo‐and‐Securities‐Lending‐Markets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37C6‐KACH]. Master: spacing.}
227 Richard Berner, Dir., Office of Fin. Research, Demystifying U.S. Repo and Securities
Lending Markets, (Sept. 9, 2015), http://financialresearch.gov/from‐the‐
director/2015/09/09/demystifying‐u‐s‐repo‐and‐securities‐lending‐markets/
[https://perma.cc/Z5ZM‐ZK6Q].
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formational shortcomings, its progress remains slow. More general‐
ly, the premise underlying the creation of the OFR is one for which
there is little precedent. In banking, supervisors play an important
role in monitoring bank activity, but the information generation in
which they engage is coupled with the authority to take actions re‐
sponsive to risks they identify.228 The benefits of giving broad in‐
formation‐related powers to an entity that lacks further authority
remain unclear.
Taking yet another step back reveals that the shadow banking
system continues to grow, and we have yet to develop a workable
paradigm that addresses the systemic risk that it poses. A shadow
banking system subject to little supervision can work very well for
an extended period of time. There are a variety of private mecha‐
nisms that can enable the issuance of money claims that are largely
insensitive to most incremental information. Yet, over time, subtle
shifts in asset quality and other risks can build up in the information
gaps that spread along with the growth of the shadow banking sys‐
tem. When money claimants become concerned about the infor‐
mation they lack, the short‐term nature of their commitments ena‐
ble them to exit quickly and without penalty. And when money
claimants withdraw en masse, the loss of that capital from a system
that had come to rely on it is likely to have far‐reaching effects. The
growth of the shadow banking system may thus be fueled by deci‐
sions that are rational for the persons providing the capital enabling
that growth while nonetheless socially suboptimal given the height‐
ened systemic risk. This core challenge remains.
2. Structural Changes
Accepting that further reforms are needed, the question becomes
what form should they take. Among the reforms for which this Arti‐
cle provides fresh support are structural reforms aimed at simplify‐
ing financial instruments and institutions and the interconnections
among them.229 Information gaps, by definition, are a subset of per‐
See supra Subsection I.B.2.
See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulating Systemically
Important
Financial
Firms
(June
3,
2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20110603a.htm
[https://perma.cc/N6MP‐DKAL] (arguing the Federal Reserve Board’s “regulatory
structure for [systemically important financial institutions] should discourage systemi‐
228
229
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tinent and knowable information. As complexity increases, so too
does the amount of potentially pertinent information. Fragmenta‐
tion nodes, for example, can produce financial instruments that are
lower variance than any of the underlying assets.230 At the same
time, these structures transform previously irrelevant issues, like
the correlation among the specific assets packaged into that frag‐
mentation node and the contractual terms setting forth the rights of
each class of the instruments subsequently issued, into information
that is pertinent and not necessarily known by anyone.
Complexity can serve socially useful functions and is the byprod‐
uct of many legitimate activities, but it also creates frictions in the
public and private mechanisms for dampening the ripples that can
emanate from bad news and restoring stability when panic sets in.
Particularly considering the significant heterogeneity in the degree
and types of complexity embedded in different instruments and the
probability that any benefits of opacity taper off beyond a certain
point, the analysis thus provides fresh support for regulations that
make it costlier for market participants to create relatively more
complex instruments and other reforms targeting complexity.
Some structural reform proposals go further. Professors Morgan
Ricks and Adam Levitin have each proposed reforms that would
drastically curtail shadow banking, and others, like Gorton and Pro‐
fessor Andrew Metrick, have proposed more modest but still signifi‐
cant structural changes.231 Most of these proposals suggest that the
government should insure a greater swath of the money claims that
get issued. In highlighting the importance of the information‐cost
savings that can arise through mandated simplicity and the ways
that guarantees promote stability by rendering otherwise pertinent
information irrelevant, the analysis here provides some new sup‐
port for these proposals. That said, I remain skeptical that the more
extreme reform proposals should be pursued at this juncture. Given
the important economic functions the shadow banking system cur‐

cally consequential growth or mergers unless the benefits to society are clearly signifi‐
cant”).
230 E.g., Judge, Fragmentation Nodes, supra note 93, at 682; Mark J. Roe, Structural
Corporate Degradation Due to Too‐Big‐To‐Fail Finance, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1419 (2014).
231 See Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 3; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 181, at
426; Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 357, 357
(2016).
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rently plays, the lack of information about the viability and costs of
such reforms, and the possibility that having a robust shadow bank‐
ing system might mitigate the macroeconomic effects of a panic in
the banking sector, it is not yet clear that such reforms would be
beneficial.232 Right now, we simply do not have the information we
need to make an informed assessment of how the benefits stack up
against the various costs such reforms could inflict.
3. State Dependent Information Generation
Given the dramatic changes in banking and the growth of the
shadow banking system, a complex financial system not fully under‐
stood by market participants or regulators is likely to be the new
normal. The analysis here highlights how systemic risk can fester in
the backwater of market participants’ and regulators’ ignorance. In‐
formation gaps not only increase the probability of a panic, but they
also impose meaningful frictions on the processes required to re‐
store stability when concerns arise. The analysis here thus supports
claims that financial regulation will inevitably have an ex post di‐
mension.233 This Article’s insights regarding the fragility arising
from information gaps provides further support for the notion that
information generation should be an important component of regu‐
lators’ ex post strategies.234
The analysis here assumes that information is costly to generate
and that the value of information and the effects of information gaps
are state dependent. Less examined here but developed further in
other work is the fact that there is often a meaningful temporal de‐
lay between the first signs indicating (and potentially triggering) a
change in state and full‐fledged market dysfunction.235 Putting these
pieces together suggests that an optimal regulatory approach may
entail accepting information gaps, but then rapidly ramping up in‐
232 For a more comprehensive analysis of why such reforms may also fail to achieve
their purported aims and may not reduce complexity, see Judge, The Importance of
“Money,” supra note 51.
233 See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can
Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 75, 77 (2013) (“argu[ing]
that” when it comes to financial stability, “while relying exclusively on ex ante regula‐
tion might at first appear to be a desirable policy objective, it will always have to be
supplemented by ex post regulation”).
234 See Judge, The First Year, supra note 182, at 843.
235 See id. at 878.
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formation production efforts when trouble first hits. Because the
early signs of trouble and the market’s response to those signs
should provide a roadmap to the specific information gaps that are
likely to be most problematic, such an approach might allow signifi‐
cantly greater tailoring with respect to the types of information
produced.236 Given the logistic and other challenges inherent in in‐
formation production and the fact that regulators may well fail to
recognize the early indicators of a crisis as such, this type of ap‐
proach would not displace the need for ongoing information pro‐
duction, but it could alter and lessen that burden.
Other considerations favoring an ex post information production
strategy are practical. Almost no one saw the Crisis coming and
much of the information that proved critical once the Crisis hit was
missing, precisely because no one had previously realized that it
would be so pertinent. As reflected in the recent work by the OFR
and other studies attempting to gauge the size and scope of the
shadow banking system, even today massive information gaps re‐
main, and there are likely other issues that may prove critical to the
next period of systemic distress that are not even among those that
regulators are now seeking to better understand. Recognizing the
inevitability of information gaps and the ways more aggressive in‐
formation generation activities during the early stages of a financial
crisis might meaningfully contain its subsequent growth provide
further support for the value of such strategies.237
C. Beyond Shadow Banking
Although focused on shadow banking, this Article’s insights also
have important implications for bank oversight. Simultaneous and
intertwined with the growth of the shadow banking system has
been the rise of a new breed of bank that does not fit the mold that
worked so well during much of the 20th century. These institutions
are large, multinational organizations that engage in a wide array of
investment banking and other activities traditionally disallowed for
banks and their affiliates. Even apart from their interconnections
with the shadow banking system, the scope of these institutions can
make it difficult for bank supervisors and even bank management to
236
237

See id. at 879.
See id.
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understand a bank’s risk exposures, creating yet new information
gaps.238
Policymakers’ interventions have not always been helpful on this
front. Even the Volcker Rule, which proponents depict as the mod‐
ern day version of the powerfully simplifying Glass‐Steagall wall
separating commercial banks and investment banks, makes little
progress in this regard.239 The Volcker Rule may reduce the risks
that banking organizations can assume, but the implementing regu‐
lations create a complex maze of restrictions for banking organiza‐
tions and their supervisors.
There are some helpful developments on the bank supervisory
front. The ongoing use of stress tests, for example, seems quite help‐
ful, particularly given that regulators seem to be using those tests to
push banks to simplify their structures and operations.240 Nonethe‐
less, bank regulation today looks very different than yesteryear,
when limits on bank activities had both the intent and effect of also
simplifying banking and facilitating meaningful oversight.241 This
Article’s analysis regarding the ways that information gaps enhance
fragility thus also raises concerns about whether the reforms un‐
derway for banking are the best ways to enhance the resilience of
that system.

238 See, e.g., Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, U.S. S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Gov’t. Affairs, 113th Congress, JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of De‐
rivatives Risks and Abuses, 1 (2013); Roe, supra note 230, at 1419.
239 See, e.g., Testimony of Gov. Daniel K. Tarullo Committee on Financial Services,
U.S. House of Representatives, Volcker Rule, Feb. 5, 2014 available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/files/tarullo20140205a.pdf
(explaining that “the agencies found that a good bit of the complexity in the proposal
was hard to avoid in the final rule” and explaining the reasons for that complexity).
240 See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Stress Testing After Five
Years,
(June
25,
2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140625a.htm
[https://perma.cc/TU9X‐6PL5] (“Because bank portfolios are often quite opaque and
thus difficult for outsiders to value, this information should allow investors, counter‐
parties, analysts, and markets more generally to make more informed judgments on the
condition of U.S. banking institutions.”).
241 See, e.g., Garten, supra note 72, at 520 (explaining that the Glass‐Steagall Act of
1933 “permitted the regulators to channel their efforts and expertise more efficiently”).
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CONCLUSION
Understanding the ways that the regulatory regimes that have
grown up to govern capital markets and banking address the differ‐
ent incentives of money and equity claimants is critical to under‐
standing the challenges posed by the shadow banking system. The
current regulatory architecture was not designed to accommodate
market‐based institutions that could produce money claims. Nor
does any single theoretical frame suffice to capture the benefits and
costs of shadow banking. Only by recognizing the limits of estab‐
lished theoretical frames and the shortcomings inherent in the cur‐
rent regulatory architecture can we hope to create the new para‐
digm required for shadow banking. The information dynamics
highlighted here are central to that challenge. There is no easy fix,
but by understanding the unique set of dynamics at play in this
space, policymakers and other experts can begin to appreciate the
ramifications of the decisions they are making.

